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IT ONCE AGAIN TAKES TWO TO TANGO: GREAT
ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO v F T.C.
PAUL J. GALArn*
In Kroger Co. v. FTC,I the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed and enforced a Federal Trade Commission order holding
that Kroger had violated section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act 2
by inducing a supplier of dairy products to sell at prices lower than
those charged other customers. When the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Purchasing Week magazine described Kroger as having
danced a "solo tango."'3 This was an appropriate observation. Although Kroger was convicted under section 2(f) of the Act, its sup* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-ndianapolis. B.A., Bowdoin College; J.D., University of Chicago.
I. 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). Retired Supreme Court
Justice Tom Clark wrote the opinion in Kroger. Kroger was analyzed in Galanti, Buyer Liability for Inducing or Receiving DiscriminatoryPrices, Terms, and PromotionalAllowances:
Caveat Emptor in the 1970's, 7 IND. L. REV. 962 (1974). The decision was discussed in Curtis,
Buyer Liability Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 ANTrrRUST L.J. 345 (1973); LaRue,
Workshop Discussion, Pricing and the Robinson-PatmanAct, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 162-64
(1971); Borowitz, Beatrice Foods: Meeting Competition and Buyer Liability, 22 CAsE W
RES. L. REV. 54 (1970). The decision was noted in 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 632 (1971). See also E.
Kintner, L. Henneberger & M. Fleischaker, "Power Buyers" and the Robinson-Patman Act
(Feb. 8, 1974) (unpublished memorandum on file in Indiana University School of LawIndianapolis library).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976). Section 2(f) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
For a discussion of buyer liability under the Robmson-Patman Act, see generally ABA,
ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 159-62 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 DEVELOPMENTS]; C.
AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 15766 (2d rev. ed. 1959); D. BAUM, ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, SUMMARY AND COMMENT 66-73 (1964);
E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 251-65 (1970); J. McCoRD, COMMENTARIES ON THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 94-104 (1968); 3 S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, THE LAwYER's ROBINSONPATMAN ACT SOURCEOOK ch. 7 (1971); THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMrrrEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT, 193-97 (1955); F RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 421-55 (1962) [hereinafter cited as F RowE]; L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST §§ 230-231 (1977) [hereinafter cited as L. SULLIVAN]; 16D J. VON KALINoWSKI, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONs-ANTrrrUsT LAws AND TRADE REGULATION §§ 36.01-.05 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as VON KALINOWSKI]; Applebaum, Fundamentalsof Buyer's Violation Under Robinson-

PatmanAct, 39 ANTrrRUST L.J. 869 (1970); Scher, New Directionsin Buyer's Liability Under
th6 Robinson-PatmanAct, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 884 (1970).
3. PURCHASING WEEK, Oct. 18, 1971, at 4.
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plier was absolved from liability under section 2(a) of the Act' for'
selling at discriminatory prices. Kroger's supplier convinced the
FTC that the prices quoted to Kroger had been offered in good faith
to meet what it believed were equally low prices offered by a competitor. 5 Kroger's supplier had successfully established the meeting
competition defense provided by section 2(b) of the Act.'
Kroger was an atypical buyer liability case. The typical seller
granting "discriminatory," that is better, prices to favored customers can be found guilty of violating the Act along with the buyer
who induced the discrimination. Kroger, however, had induced the
supplier to reduce prices for the dairy products by claiming falsely
that it had received lower bids from the supplier's competitor.7 To
both the FTC and the Sixth Circuit, Kroger's misrepresentation
made it a "lying buyer," which justified condemning Kroger while
exonerating the supplier who was unaware of the deception.
When Kroger was decided, this author believed that the Sixth
Circuit's view of the liability of the lying buyer would prevail if the
4. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Section 2(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them
Id.
5. Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d
1372, 1373-74 (6thi Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). See generally Applebaum, supra
note 2; Borowitz, supra note 1; Scher, supra note 2.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). Section 2(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Upon proof being made
that there has been discrimination in price or
services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case
thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a
violation of this section
Provided, however, that nothing herein contained
shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that
his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or
purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
Id.
7. 438 F.2d at 1378.
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proper case ever reached the Supreme Court.' The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC,' however, forces a reconsideration of this view despite the
Court's disclaimer that it was not deciding whether a "lying buyer"
could be liable under section 2(f) where the seller is absolved from
liability under the meeting competition defense.' The Court in
A&P reversed a Second Circuit decision11 that denied a petition for
review of an FTC finding that A&P had violated section 2(f) of the
Act and granted enforcement of the FTC order. Although A&P
knew when it accepted a supplier's second bid that it substantially
bettered the bid of the supplier's competitor, the bid was not
clearly induced by any misrepresentations. A&P, therefore, was not
a lying buyer, and the Court was facially correct in stating that the
lying buyer issue had not been reached. The holding and the tone
of A&P unfortunately make survival of Kroger unlikely 12 The primary purpose of this Article is to assess the impact of the A&P
decision and other recent developments upon the basic elements of
buyer liability under section 2(f) of the Act.
Although this author agrees with Justice Marshall's observation
that the buyer who induces a discriminatory price by means of lies
and misrepresentations probably will escape liability if the majority of the Supreme Court is consistent m its interpretation of section 2(f),'13 nothing assures that any court will be consistent in dealing with the Robinson-Patman Act. Consequently, if the Court
8. See Galanti, supra note 1, at 975-77.
9. 440 U.S. 69 (1979). Only eight members of the Court participated in the decision. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined in the opmion of the Court delivered by Justice Stewart. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, and Justice Marshall filed an opinion dissenting in part. Justice
Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. See the discussion of A&P
in The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-FederalStatutes and Regulations, 93 HARv. L. REv. 234
(1979).
10. 440 U.S. at 81 n.15.
ii. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g 87 F.T.C. 962
(1976). Borden, the supplier in A&P, filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Cause No. 73-C-1187, seeking a determination that the FTC was without
authority to proceed under its complaint. Counts I and 11 of the Borden complaint were
dismissed on June 7, 1973 and October 19, 1973, respectively. The dismissal of the complaint
was affirmed on appeal. Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 495 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1974).
12. Justice Marshall, dissenting in part in A&P, 440 U.S. at 88-92, strongly urged this
point.
13. Id.
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were to uphold section 2(f) liability of the Kroger-type lying buyer,
it could claim that the A&P situation was factually distinguishable.
As the law presently stands, the Court in A&P in effect has repealed section 2(f) as against large chain stores and other giant
"power buyers" except those neither sufficiently clever nor well
enough advised to avoid overtly conspiring with a seller in obtaming discounts unavailable to small businesses." The Court, by
interpreting section 2(f) as precluding buyer liability unless the
seller also can be found liable for price discrimination under section 2(a) of the Act, conceivably struck a blow against inflation by
reducing price uniformity, but only by doing violence to a statute
that the Court itself has indicated was aimed at protecting both
competitors and competition. 5
This is not to say that violence to the Robinson-Patman Act is
not justified, but quaere whether the Supreme Court, rather than
Congress, is the appropriate forum. 6 Many economists and scholars have urged drastic revision, if not repeal, of the Robinson-Patman Act. The gist of most of these attacks is that the Act is anticompetitive in spirit because it imposes restraints on price
bargaining that are alien or supposedly alien to our competitive
economy " Indeed, the Robinson-Patman Act is not only anticom14. Ms. Sylvia Porter in her column "Your Money's Worth" rhetorically asked small entrepreneurs if they were "aware that no longer does the Robinson-Patman Act of
1936--known as the 'Magna Charts' of small business-prevent deals between big manufacturers and their big customers-that can promote the equivalent of a monopoly against you
and drive you, a 'mom and pop' retailer or other little business, to the wall?" The Indianapolis Star, June 9, 1979, at 32, col. 5.
15. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 695 (1967); Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1954); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,
49 (1948). See also Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case,
77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 9, at 241-43. Admittedly,
the courts have not always been consistent on this point. See generally 16C VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 2, § 28.03.
16. Ms. Porter, in her column cited supra note 14, opined that "the Supreme Court has
accomplished what critics of the law couldn't get from Congress," that is, a gutting of the
Robinson-Patman Act that Congress refused to do because of a violent reaction by small
businesses against a suggested repeal of the Act.
17. The literature is encyclopedic. See, e.g., C. EDWARDS, THE PR cE DiscuMiNATioN LAW
617-35, 646-57 (1959); M. HANDLER, CASES AND MATER S ON TRADE REGULMTION 1131-48 (4th
ed. 1967); Austin, Isn't Thirty Years Enough?, 30 ABA ANTrrRUsT SECTION 18 (1966); Backman, An Economist Looks at the Robinson-Patman Act, 17 ABA ANTIrRUST SECTON 343
(1960); Cooper, Price Discnmination Law and Economic Efficiency, 75 MicH. L. REv. 962
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petitive but also confusing and turgid.
Fairness, however, demands that the historical milieu that produced the Act be recalled. Congress adopted the Robinson-Patman
Act in 1936 as an amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Antitrust
Act when, as a result of economic dislocations caused by the depression, excessively low prices were regarded as evil and "cut
throat" competition was considered a threat to survival of the
economy This environment also produced fair trade laws permitting manufacturers to fix prices at which retailers could sell brand
name products. 8 In fact, during the depression, even the Supreme
Court was deemphasizing, if not ignoring, the benefits of price
competition m enforcing section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act"
in price-fixing cases."
BACKGROUND OF SECTION

2(f)

A brief review of section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, or,
more properly designated, section 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,2 1 is appropriate before discussing the impact of A&P on the enforcement of the Act against
what some have characterized as "power buyer abuses. 22 Section
(1977); Levi, The Robinson-Patman Act-Is It In the Public Interest?, 1 ABA ANTITRUST
SECTON 60 (1952); Rowe, The Robuison-PatmanAct-Thirty Years Thereafter, 30 ABA ANTRUST SECTION 9 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 9, at 241-43. As Rowe
pointed out in his remarks at the 1966 Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association
Antitrust Section, supra at 10-11, "Today criticism of the Act's enforcement is mounting.
The sleek indignation of Fortune Magazine [Editorial, Antitrust: The Sacred Cow Needs a
Vet, FORTUNE, Nov. 1962, at 104-06] is matched by the hairy outrage of the New Republic,
no less, at the FrC's Robinson-Patman 'attack on small businessmen who form co-ops.'
[Ridgeway, Out of Business-By FTC Order, THn NEw REPuBLic, Feb. 12, 1966, at 13]."
The Act is not without its defenders, but even they recognize the need for administrative
changes. See, e.g., Loughlen, The Little Statute that Ran Away, 56 A.B.A.J. 681 (1970); Van
Cise, No, Thirty Years Are Not Enough, 30 ABA ANTTRUST SECTION 28 (1966). Even those
critics who recognize that some economic losses can be accepted in pursuit of social or political goals posit that the Act as it now stands serves no legitimate goal. Cooper, supra.
18. These blatantly anticompetitive laws were in force until the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801, withdrew the exemption given to such resale
price maintenance statutes by the federal antitrust statutes. See generally L. SULtIVAN,
supra note 2, § 131.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
20. Compare Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) with United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See generally L. SuLivAN, supra note
2, at 175-86.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976).
22. Address by Miles W Kirkpatrick, Antitrust Law Section of the New York State Bar
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2(f) is the primary, but not the exclusive, proscription against a
buyer inducing or receiving discriminatory, and presumably more
favorable, prices, terms, or conditions of sale or promotional allowances than are available to his competition. In addition to section 2(f), purchasers can incur liability under section 2(c) of the
Act for receiving improper brokerage payments, under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act 24 for engaging m what can be
characterized as "unfair methods of competition," and possibly,
2
though unlikely, under section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. 1
Association (January 28, 1971). Mr. Kirkpatrick is a former Chairman of the FTC. See also
Address by Basil J. Mezines, Executive Director, FTC, Automobile Warehouse Distributor
Association (March 6, 1973); Address by Lawrence G. Meyer, Director, Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, FTC, Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Texas (July 1, 1971).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976). See generally F Rows, supra note 2, at 337; L. SuLLivAN,
supra note 2, at 697-99; 16D voN KALiNowsKi, supra note 2, §§ 33.01-.04.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibit
a seller from granting promotional allowances or services to customers unless such allowances or services are available or accorded to all competing customers on proportionally
equal terms. Id. §§ 13(d), (e). Section 2(f) by its terms does not apply to buyers who induce
favorable promotional allowances or services, so the FTC has utilized the general prohibitions of § 5 to stop such practices. See, e.g., Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1962); Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. demed, 372 U.S. 910
(1963). See generally F Rows, supra note 2, § 14.5; 16D VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, §
36.0211]; Galanti, supra note 1, at 996-99. This technique has not escaped criticism. See,
e.g., 1 M. HANDLER, TwENTY-FivE YEARS OF ANTiTRUST 67-68, 420-31, 665-77 (1973); 2 id. at
1030-43; Alexander, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, a Deus ex Machina in
the Tragic Interpretationof the Robirson-PatmanAct, 12 SYRAcusE L. REv. 317 (1961); Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act With the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MicH. L. REv. 821, 851 (1961).
The Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73 n.14
(1953), expressly left unresolved the question of the applicability of § 2(f) to buyer-induced
violations of § 2(d) and § 2(e) of the Act; A&P, however, makes anything but a negative
answer unlikely.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, § 1 of the RobinsonPatman Act which amended § 2 of the Clayton Act and is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(f)
(1976), and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), must be distinguished. The first is
not an "antitrust law" within the meaning of § 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976)
and thus cannot be enforced by the private treble damage suits authorized under § 4 of the
Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Nashville Milk Co. v Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373
(1958). The latter two provisions are "antitrust laws" enforceable by private actions.
Section 3 of the Robmson-Patman Act provides criminal sanctions that parallel and
largely duplicate the civil sanctions of § 2 and appears to apply to buyers as well as to
sellers. The actual application of section 3 to buyers, however, has not been tested thoroughly in the courts. Frederick M. Rowe, the foremost Robinson-Patman Act scholar, argues
that § 3 is limited to sellers. F ROWE, supra note 2, at 459-60. The enforcement history of §
3 supports Rowe's hypothesis, at least tangentially. The Justice Department has been reluctant to invoke the sanction against buyers, perhaps because of some serious doubts as to the
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The history of section 2(f) is ironical. Section 2 of the Clayton
Act, as adopted in 1914, was directed against localized price-cutting by monopolistic sellers intending to force competitors out of
business" and was not intended to combat price coercion on sellers
by large volume buyers such as the food and chain stores. 2 Thus,
constitutionality of the provision. For example, in the proceedings reported m United States
v. Bowman Dairy Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62,403 (N.D. Ill. 1949), only the dairy product
sellers and not the chain store buyers were indicted under § 3. In United States v. Maryland
& Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 151 F Supp. 438 (D.D.C. 1957), both the purchasing dairy
and the selling cooperative were indicted under § 3, but the indictment was dismissed voluntarily before trial. In United States v. H.P Hood & Sons, 1963 Trade Cas.
70,728 (D.
Mass. 1963), the buyer and the seller were charged with violating §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, but only the seller was charged with violating § 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act. Both defendants were acquitted on March 19, 1965. ABA, ANTrrRUST DEVELoPMENTs
1955-68, at 156 n.5 (1968).
The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
supra note 2, characterized § 3 as "dangerous surplusage" and urged repeal after observing
that "doubts besetting section 3's constitutionality seem well founded; no gloss imparted by
history or adjudication has settled the vague contours of this harsh criminal law. It does not
serve the public interest of antitrust policy." Id. at 201 (footnote omitted). The constitutionality issue was resolved partially in United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S.
29 (1963), in which the final of the three substantive clauses of § 3, unreasonably low prices,
was held "constitutional as applied." Id. at 33.
Section 3 rarely has been invoked since 1958, when it was held m Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958), that it was not an "antitrust law." Treble damage actions will lie, however, when conduct proscribed by § 3 also violates § 2. Englander Motors,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 186 F Supp. 82, 84 (N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd, 293 F.2d 802 (6th Cir.
1961). For a general discussion of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, see D. BAUM, supra note
2, at 74-76; 1 M. HANDLER, supra note 24, at 304-08; E. KINTNER, supra note 2, at 266-80;
1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 162-64; F ROWE, supra note 2, at 452-75; id. at 112-17
(Supp. 1964); 16D VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, ch. 37.
Abuse of power by large and aggressive buyers also can result in civil liability under the
Sherman Act. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948). Buyers inducing or coercing secret price discriminations have been prosecuted successfully on criminal charges brought under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United
States v. New York Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F Supp. 626, 676 (E.D. InI. 1946), aff'd,
173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949). A buyer inducing or receiving price or related commercial discnminations also might violate the myriad of state laws applicable to price discriminations.
For a general survey of state law in this area, see [1973] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
351096; F ROWE, supra note 2, § 3.6.
26. F RowE, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 6. For the background and legislative history of the
Robmson-Patman Act, see D. BAUM, supra note 2, at 1-5; C. EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 128, F RowE, supra note 2, §§ 1.1-1.7, 14.1, & app., at 559-620; 16B VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 2, chs. 21-22.
27. The original language of § 2, Pub. L. No. 212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), appeared to bar
price discriminations prejudicial to competition on the customer level, but court decisions in
the 1920's restricted it to seller or primary line competition. See, e.g., National Biscuit Co.
v. FTC, 299 F 733 (2d Cir. 1924); Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 F 774 (2d Cir. 1923). Even the
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section 2 of the Clayton Act was inadequate to deal with the problem of the power buyer abuses that arose in the late 1920's and
early 1930's. Although the problem was perceived as one of buyers
forcing sellers to grant discounts unavailable to other purchasers,
the key buyer liability provision, which was adapted from language
in another bill being considered by Congress, was added only as an
afterthought during Senate debates.2 8 Congress's primary answer to
the problem of power buyers was the enactment of legislation making it illegal for sellers to grant discriminatory prices or more
favorable promotional allowances to selected customers. Although
the anomalous approach of ending buyer abuse by regulating sellers seems inappropriate, the legislation can and has been explained
by examining Congress's doubts about its constitutional power to
prohibit buyers from inducing or receiving favorable price
29
discriminations.
Basically, section 2(f) prohibits a buyer from knowingly inducing
or receiving a price reduction or discount that would cause the
seller to violate section 2(a) of the Act. Commentators long have
argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FTC0 required the acquittal of a buyer whose
seller was exculpated for whatever reason in a companion proceeding under section 2(a) of the Act. 3 1 A&P vindicates this position by
construing section 2(f) liability as exclusively derivative in nature
and dependent upon a finding of section 2(a) liability This rule
usually produces an appropriate result. If section'2(a) has not been
violated because no price discrimination or injury to competition
Supreme Court, in George Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929),
repudiating the restrictive interpretation of § 2, did not revitalize its vis-a-vis chain stores

because the provision unconditionally exempted price differentials made "on account of differences in the grade, quality or quantity of the commodity sold
" This quantity discount exemption gave chain stores, in Rowe's words, "carte blanche for unlimited purchasing advantages which the FTC felt powerless to check with the legal safeguards of Section 2
of the original Clayton Act." F RowE, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 7. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939).
28. The provision originated in S. 4024, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). See C. EDWARDS,
supra note 17, at 45-46; F ROWE, supra note 2, § 14.1, at 423-25.
29. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927). See generally F Rows,
supra note 2, § 14.1.
30. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
31. See generally C. AusTiN, supra note 2, at 161-62; D. BAUM, supra note 2, at 69; J.
McCoRD, supra note 2, at 96; Rowe, Pricing and the Robnson-Patman Act, 41 ANTrrRusT
L.J. 98, 103-04 (1971).
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has occurred, 3 the buyer has done nothing unlawful.

In some circumstances, however, a seller who has granted discriminatory prices that have injured competition may escape liability by showing that the lower prices were quoted in good faith to
meet what the seller thought were the equally low prices of a competitor. A seller who makes such a showing has established the
meeting competition defense under section 2(b) of the Act.3 3 This
defense is absolute, even though the FTC or any private plaintiff
has established all the elements of a section 2(a) violation. 4 To
give a seller the right to cut prices to keep or even gain new customers 5 without having to lower prices to all his existing customers
is sensible. Unfortunately, a situation can occur in which the seller
in good faith believes his discriminatory prices are being offered to
meet competition while the buyer in fact knows the seller is beating rather than meeting competition."5
The buyer in these situations might be "guilty" or "innocent",
that is, he might have been a lying buyer who has misled the seller
as in Kroger, or he might have been the recipient of a "better" bid
who merely declines to disabuse the seller of the notion that a
lower bid was met but not beaten. A&P may or may not have been
32. See text accompanying notes 124-44 infra.
33. Section 2(b) is set out in note 6 supra.
34. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 251 (1951). With two insignificant exceptions,
the competitor must be the seller's and not the buyer's. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505
(1963); Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 478 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859
(1973). For the elements of and the problems surrounding the meeting competition defense,
see C. AUsTIN, supra note 2, ch. IV; D. BAuM, supra note 2, at 29-37; 1 M. HANDLER, supra
note 24, at 522-28, 560-64; 1975 DEvELOPMENTs, supra note 2, at 143-49; F RowE, supra note
2, ch. 9; L. SULLivAN, supra note 2, § 229; 16C VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 32.02.
35. A split of authority exists as to whether the meeting competition defense can be used
aggressively to capture new customers or is limited to self-defense against price attacks. The
trend, however, is clearly toward accepting the aggressive use of § 2(b). Compare Standard
Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 361 U.S. 826 (1959) with
Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1974) and Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1973) and Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48, 52
(7th Cir. 1962), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974).
36. The FTC has adopted a "meet but not beat" rule that denies the defense when sellers
undercut the competitive price, e.g., National Dairy Prods. Corp., 70 F.T.C. 79 (1966), af'd,
395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 393 U.S. 977 (1968), but courts have permitted incidental undercutting when the seller otherwise has acted mngood faith. See, e.g., International
Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 424
U.S. 943 (1976); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. dented, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
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in the latter category 31
IMPACT OF

A&P

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION

2(f)

IN KROGER

The respondent in Kroger was convicted of a section 2(f) violation by claiming falsely that it had received lower bids from the
seller's competitor although the FTC absolved the seller of liability
on the basis of the section 2(b) meeting competition defense.3 8 The

court in Kroger recognized that section 2(f) liability was "almost"
exclusively derivative in nature. The court acknowledged that
under Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 39 a buyer is
guilty of violating section 2(f) only if he knows that the price induced is illegal or not within one of the defenses available to the
seller. It concluded, however, that a buyer who has "conned" a
seller should not escape liability and interpreted the Automatic
Canteen requirement that the buyer know the induced price was
not within one of the seller's defenses to permit considering the
buyer's knowledge from his own vantage point as well as that of the
seller. In other words, the buyer who knows that the section 2(b)
defense in fact is unjustified is guilty even if it would be available
to a deceived purchaser. The court m Kroger stated the rule as
follows:
In order for the buyer to be sheltered through the exoneration of
the seller under section 2(b) the prices induced must come
within the defenses of that section not only from the seller's
point of view but also from that of the buyer. To hold otherwise
would violate the purposes of the Act, and frustrate the intent of
the Congress."
An opposite result would "put a premium on the buyer's artifice
and cunning in inducing discriminatory prices." 4 '
In effect, Kroger held that section 2(f) was not totally dependent
on section 2(a) liability Although the Court m A&P purportedly
held only that a buyer such as A&P who had done no more than
accept the lower of two competitively offered prices does not violate
37. Justice Marshall was not convinced of A&P's innocence. 440 U.S. at 91-92.
38. Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), afi'd sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d
1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
39. 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
40. 438 F.2d at 1377.
41. Id.
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section 2(f) when the seller has a meeting competition defense, the
totally derivative nature of section 2(f) liability is now clearly established. Consequently, the Kroger exception, which depended on
a construction of section 2(f) that liability was not totally dependent on a section 2(a) violation, cannot logically or consistently
exist.
The scuttling of Kroger is unfortunate even if a "solo tango" is a
rare case. A seller cannot establish the good faith element of the
meeting competition defense unless it is dealing with an adept lying buyer who simultaneously can disguise the facts completely
and exert extreme pricing pressure. The good faith element of the
section 2(b) defense requires the seller to act as a "prudent businessman responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a situation of competitive necessity "42 It has long been thought that this
element precluded a seller from taking a buyer's word at face value
and that it must make some effort to substantiate that the alleged
competitive bid in fact was made. 3 Unfortunately, the simple expedient of calling up a competitor to verify the offer now involves
the substantial risk of liability for price-fixing under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 4 Other ways, however, exist by which the veracity of a buyer can be ascertained. 5 The question posed after the
decision m A&P is whether these efforts are likely to be fruitful
when the buyer knows the beneficial consequences of successful
deception.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE

A&P

DECISION

The A&P litigation was extraordinarily lengthy, lasting well over
seven years. The private label milk arrangement with the Borden
Company that triggered the proceeding, however, was terminated
42. Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963). See also FTC v. A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
43. See Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255, 259-60 (3d Cir. 1969), in which the
court concluded that respondent had not shown the requisite good faith in failing to investigate the veracity of a buyer who reported a competitive offer in an oral communication and
in failing to verify a competitive offer reported by an experienced salesman who had been
with the company for 18 years. See generally 16C VoN I
lowsIu, supra note 2, §
32.02[2][a].
44. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
45. See generally 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 145; F Rows, supra note 2, at 22034; 16C VON KAuNowsKi, supra note 2, § 32.02[2][a].
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voluntarily by A&P in February of 1972, only four months after the
FTC complaint was issued." The litigation arose from A&P's attempt to secure savings in its dairy product business by switching
from selling Borden brand label milk, milk sold under the brand
name of the supplying dairy, in its Chicago unit of over 200 stores
in northern Illinois, thirty-five stores in neighboring northwestern
Indiana and a few stores m Iowa, to selling private label milk under
its own A&P label.
At the time, A&P was one of Borden's major customers in the
Chicago area, and Borden was concerned that its newly constructed
dairy processing facility near Chicago would be underutilized if it
lost the A&P account. Borden's first bid to A&P for private label
milk was premised on A&P's acceptance of limited delivery service.
According to Borden, this would have reduced A&P's annual dairy
costs by $410,000. A&P also received a bid from a competing dairy
that would have produced estimated annual savings of approximately $737,000. Instead of merely accepting the lower bid, A&P's
Chicago unit buyer telephoned Borden's Chicago chain store manager and informed him that Borden's initial offer was not "in the
ballpark." 47 When pressed for details as to what would be in the
ballpark, the A&P representative responded that a $50,000 im'48
provement in the bid "would not be a drop in the pocket [siC].
Borden's Chicago agent apparently was told by his superiors to
"save the [A&P] business. ' ' 49 Borden then doubled A&P's expected
annual savings under the private label program to $820,000. The
Borden representative advised A&P when the second bid was made
that it was offered only to meet the rival bid. In other words, Borden doubled its bid without knowing the amount of the rival bid or
even its lawfulness under the Act and claimed it was meeting competition. This author is skeptical that Borden genuinely believed it
was meeting, and not beating, competition when it doubled the
46. The FTC complaint was filed on October 8, 1971. After extensive discovery and Borden's ill-fated'attempt to block the proceedings, the hearing itself took 110 days. The Commission entered the final order on April 29, 1976. The Second Circuit upheld the order on
June 21, 1977, and the Supreme Court reversed on February 22, 1979.
47. 557 F.2d at 976.
48. Id. In its review of the facts, the Supreme Court recited that the representative had
stated that the improvement in the bid" 'would not be a drop in the bucket.'" 440 U.S. 69,
73 (1979). Later in the opinion, however, the Court quoted that the improvement " 'would
not be a drop in the pocket.' " Id. at 83.
49. 557 F.2d at 976.
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proposed savings knowing only that a $50,000 improvement would
be insignificant. For all Borden knew, the rival bid might have
been $500,000 and not $737,000. The fact that there could have
been a much greater disparity between the rival bid and the ultimate Borden bid escaped the Supreme Court.rs
The FTC filed a three-count complaint against A&P for its efforts. Count one charged A&P with violating section 5 of the FTC
Act in misleading Borden while negotiating the private label milk
contract by failing to inform Borden that its second bid had not
just met, but had beaten substantially, the competitive bid. Count
two charged that the same conduct violated section 2(f) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Count three charged A&P and Borden with
combining to stabilize and maintain the retail and wholesale price
of milk and other dairy products in violation of section 5 of the

FTC Act."2
As to the first count, the FTC Administrative Law Judge found
that A&P had acted unfairly and deceptively in accepting the Borden bid without informing Borden that it beat the rival bid, thus
precluding the meeting competition defense. 3 A&P's conduct vio50. Before A&P accepted the second and final Borden bid, it requested a letter from Borden to the effect that the prices being offered A&P were proportionally available to other
buyers. A&P clearly was seeking a Robinson-Patman Act clean bill of health letter but in
fact received a letter stating only that Borden felt its prices were proper under the applicable
law and it was prepared to defend them. A&P's legal department also reviewed the bid
before it was accepted. Id.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). This section provides m relevant part: "(1) Unfair methods of
competition m or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices m or affectmg commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."
52. The FTC has used § 5 to "bolster" and "supplement" the Sherman Act, which is not
specifically enforced by the Commission, and §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14
and 18 (1976), which are enforced. See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co.,
344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 14 (7th Cir. 1971); Beatrice Foods Co., 67
F.T.C. 473 (1965).
In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972), the Supreme Court answered affirmatively the twofold question whether § 5 empowers the FTC to "define and
proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe either
the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws," and also to "proscribe practices as unfair or
deceptive in their effect upon consumers regardless of their nature or quality as competitive
practices or their effect on competition." For consideration of § 5 as an "antitrust law," see
1975 DEvELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 167-74, and authorities cited in M. HANDLER, TRADE
REGULATION 1310-11 (4th ed. 1968); S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws
621-40 (3d ed. 1968). For a criticism of this practice, see authorities cited at note 24 supra.
53. 87 F.T.C. 962, 967-1046 (1976).
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lated the policy of the Robinson-Patman Act and consequently violated section 5 of the FTC Act. As to the second count, the judge
found that A&P had violated section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman
Act by knowingly inducing or receiving the discriminatory prices in
the purchase of dairy products. As to the third count charging a
combination to stabilize and maintain milk prices, the judge concluded that the FTC had not satisfied its burden of proof and dismissed the count.
On review, the FTC reversed the decision on count one. The
Commission characterized that charge as being aimed at what
must be legally disclosed during contract negotiations and believed
that A&P's failure to disclose affirmatively the terms of the rival
bid was not an unfair trade practice under section 5. So to construe
section 5 would be "contrary to normal business practice and
contrary to the public interest."5 Notwithstanding its reversal of
count one, the Commission affirmed the finding of liability under
section 2(f) because the sales by Borden met the jurisdictional requirements of the Act in that at least one purchase was in "commerce," that the evidence demonstrated the presence of discriminatory prices that resulted in competitive injury, and that by
virtue of its trade experience and common sense A&P knew, or
should have known, that it was the beneficiary of a price discrimination having the requisite harmful competitive effects. 5
The FTC rejected A&P's two affirmative defenses to the charge
of illegal price discrimination. The first was the Automatic Canteen defense ultimately accepted by the Supreme Court. A&P argued that Borden had submitted the final bid in a good faith effort
to meet the rival dairy's bid and that because Borden had a meeting competition defense, A&P could not be liable despite its knowledge that Borden had undercut the other bid. The Commission,
54. Id. at 1050.
55. Id. at 1051-55. The FTC affirmed the dismissal of the third count because there was
insufficient evidence to show that A&P and Borden had combined to stabilize dairy prices.
Id. at 1066-68..A&P's claim that it was denied due process of law by the FTC's delay in
initiating the proceedings was dismissed by the Commission because the delays were reasonably related to the complexity of the case and to A&P's own failure to evidence any concern
for speedy resolution of the matter. Id. at 1068-69. The Commission also rejected A&P's
challenge to the Administrative Law Judge's order that required A&P to distribute copies of
the order to all of its milk and dairy product suppliers throughout the country as well as
imposing the burden on A&P of going forward with the meeting competition defense in the
future. Id. at 1069-72.
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following Kroger, concluded that a buyer charged with violating
section 2(f) must come within the meeting competition defense not
only from the seller's point of view but also from his own in order
to escape liability even without the misrepresentations or lies present m that case. Even if Borden could have defended a section
2(a) complaint by the FTC had one been brought, this was insufficient to absolve A&P of wrongdoing because A&P knew the terms
of both bids before accepting the Borden bid. The FTC also rejected the contention that A&P could not violate section 2(f) unless
Borden, as the seller, was found guilty of giving illegal price discrimination under section 2(a) prior to or at the same time. 5
The Commission also rejected A&P's second defense that the discriminatory prices offered were justified under the cost justification
defense of section 2(a) 51 If the discriminatory prices induced or received by A&P in fact were cost justified or if A&P was unaware of
the unavailability of that defense to Borden, A&P would be absolved." The cost justification study presented by A&P, however,
was found to be so defective and inadequate that it could not support A&P's belief that the second Borden bid was cost justified.
The latter conclusion is not surprising because Borden simply
doubled its initial bid. Furthermore, Borden's indication that its
56. Id. at 1056-57. The FTC noted that it alone established the enforcement policy that
best will accomplish the ends contemplated by Congress, citing FTC v. Universal-Rundle
Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 251 (1967), and that it could proceed only against A&P because it, not
Borden, was the principal malefactor. 87 F.T.C. at 1057.
57. The cost justification defense is established by the first proviso of § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1976), which provides "[tihat nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered." For a seller to sustain a cost justification defense is not easy.
Good accountants are a necessity. The problem is that workable criteria for the defense do
not exist, and the courts have required accurate and actual, not estimated, data on the
savings involved. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPoir, supra note 2, at 171-75; 16C VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 32.03[i],
at 32-86 through 32-92. Some judicial broadening of the defense has occurred as the use of
average cost data for similar and legitimate customer groups has been permitted, United
States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962), but the use of reasonable approximations rather
than actual cost data still is not allowed. See 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 138. For a
discussion on the problems presented by the defense and the various techniques developed
in its use, see C. AusTIN, supra note 2, at 59-70; D. BAUM, supra note 2, at 22-25; C. EDWARDS, supra note 17, ch. 18; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 136-40; F ROWE, supra
note 2, at 10; L. SULLIvAN, supra note 2, § 228; 16C VON KALINOwSKI, supra note 2, § 32.02.
58. The cost justification defense is an absolute one. United States v. Borden Co., 370
U.S. 460 (1962); Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 66-69 (1953).
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final offer was made solely to meet competition did, or at least
should have, put A&P on notice that Borden could not cost justify
the second offer. Borden also informed A&P that it would either
lose money or at best make a minimal profit on private label sales
to A&P All this, coupled with A&P's trade experience,59 sufficed to
support the conclusion that the second offer was not cost justified
or was "not known" by A&P not to be within the cost justification
defense.
THE JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE

On appeal, the first issue considered by the Second Circuit was
A&P's jurisdictional challenge that the transactions with Borden
were not m interstate commerce and hence were not subject to the
Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits an illegal price discrimination only "where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce
"60 The Second Circuit's rejection of this argument is significant because the Supreme Court,
although reversing the decision of the Second Circuit, did not discuss the jurisdictional element. Consequently, the Second Circuit's
holding on this point presumably is good law That A&P abandoned the contention in the Supreme Court, although possible,
seems unlikely, particularly in light of the Court's recent decision
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,"i which narrowly construed
the jurisdictional scope of the Act.
In Copp, the Court held that jurisdiction under the RobinsonPatman Act requires more than the Sherman Act's showing that
the allegedly anticompetitive activities affected commerce. The
Court stated that to trigger the Act, the allegedly discriminatory
sales must have occurred in the course of the seller's interstate activities and at least one of the sales giving rise to the price discrimination must have been made in interstate commerce.6 2 Even
though the commodities involved were used m the construction of
interstate highways and hence arguably had a "nexus" to commerce, the Court refused to apply the Sherman Act test to the dis59. For a discussion of "trade experience," see text accompanying notes 149-52 tnfra.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
61. 419 U.S. 186 (1974). The Court in A&P simply noted that the Commission had found
that the commerce requirement of § 2(f) had been satisfied. 440 U.S. at 74 n.4.
62. 419 U.S. at 195.
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tinct "in commerce" language of the Robinson-Patman Act. The
Court rejected the nexus approach as an irrational method of expanding the scope of the restrictive language of the Robinson-Patman Act."3 The Court also rejected as unsupported by the legislative history of the Act the alternative position of the Department of
Justice in an amicus brief that Congress intended the "in commerce" language to be construed to encompass the full scope of
Congress's constitutional power to regulate commerce. It therefore
affirmed the long standing interpretation that section 2(a) applies
only when " 'at least one of the two transactions which, when compared, generate a discrimination

. cross[es] a state line.' "6

In A&P, substantially all of the private label milk purchased
from Borden was processed in Borden's Illinois processing plant.
That plant, in turn, acquired approximately sixty percent of its
milk from Wisconsin dairy farmers. That the milk purchases for
stores in Indiana, and presumably in Iowa, were in interstate commerce was undisputed. A question, however, did exist whether the
63. Id. at 198.
64. Id. at 200 (quoting Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A&S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4, 9 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969)). The Court pointed out that Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954), was not contradictory. Although the opinion contains language that
Congress was concerned with an interstate corporation financing local level predatory practices by means of a "war chest" built up from multistate operations, one of the discriminatory sales involved in Moore was in commerce. See also Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963); Roorda v. American Oil
Co., 446 F Supp. 939 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
Professor Sullivan posits that the restrictive commerce requirements of §§ 3 and 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 8 (1976), might be anomalous because the Clayton and
Sherman Acts are parts of a "coherent antitrust policy." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 714.
In United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., Inc., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), for example, the Court rejected the contention that the Clayton Act should be construed as broadly
as the Sherman Act because it was enacted to supplement the Sherman Act and arrest incipient Sherman Act violations. The Court held that § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8
(1976), did not apply to a national building maintenance service firm engaged in commerce
acquiring a local firm that was not in commerce. Confining the range of the Robinson-Patman Act as narrowly as its jurisdictional terms permits, however, best serves the goal of
balancing the tension between the policies of the Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman
Act. See L. SuLvAN, supra note 2, at 714.
Furthermore, the jurisdictional scope of § 5 of the FTC Act, which was phrased initially
in terms of "in commerce," was amended by the Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §
201(a), 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)), to broaden the scope of that
act to encompass conduct that is in or affects commerce. Congress, of course, can broaden
the reach of a statute to the outer boundaries of the commerce clause when it so desires, and
its failure to do so with the Robinson-Patman Act indicates congressional acceptance of the
limited jurisdiction of the Act.
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private label milk sold in Illinois stores was in interstate commerce. The Second Circuit upheld the FTC's determination that
the milk was still in interstate commerce because it was not substantially altered, chemically or otherwise, by processing in the Illinois plant after it was purchased from Wisconsin farmers. In other
words, the milk was in a continuous "flow or stream of commerce"
from the Wisconsin farms to the Illinois processing plant to the
shelves of retail grocery establishments.' 5
Apparently, the "flow of commerce" jurisdictional test articu6 survived Copp. Under this test,
lated in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC"
the- Act applies when goods produced in one state are shipped into
another state for storage or minor processing. Those goods, or to
use the terminology of section 2(a), commodities, retain their interstate nature and satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Act.
As stated by the Court in Standard Oil, "Any other conclusion
would fall short of the recognized purpose of the Robinson-Patman
Act to reach the operations of large interstate businesses in competition with small local concerns. Such temporary storage of the
[commodity] as occurs within the Detroit area does not deprive the
[commodity] of its interstate character." 7
Although one court recently has expressed doubt as to the continued viability of the flow of commerce doctrine,"8 other courts
continue to view the Standard Oil test as a viable doctrine. A motion to dismiss a section 2(a) complaint was denied in Roorda v.
American Oil Co."9 over the defendant's assertion that the sales
had not crossed a state line and hence were not in commerce. Upholding the complaint, the district court noted that the asphaltic
concrete in Copp never was in interstate commerce. It was pro65. 557 F.2d at 979. See also Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965). The court recognized limits to the flow of commerce doctrine when it sustained A&P's argument that such products as the cottage cheese, fortified
skim milk, buttermilk, and egg nog supplied by Borden were outside the scope of the Act
because they were chemically changed from their origin as raw milk by a variety of processes
and additions at Borden's Illinois plant. 557 F.2d at 979 n.7.
66. 340 U.S. 231 (1951). For a discussion of the test, see generally F RowE, supra note 2, §
4.9; 16C VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 26.02[3][a]; Note, The Interstate Commerce Requirement of Section 2(a) of the Robmson-Patman Act, 44 U. CoLo. L. REV. 607 (1973).
67. 340 U.S. at 237-38.
68. Red Apple Supermarkets, Inc. v. Deltown Foods, Inc., 419 F Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). See text accompanying notes 98-106 infra.
69. 446 F Supp. 939 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
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duced and used exclusively in California; therefore, the purely intrastate character of the transactions precluded application of the
flow of commerce theory Roorda acknowledged that Copp refused
to expand the relatively restrictive flow of commerce doctrine to
include items with a nexus to interstate commerce, but pointed out
that the Court in Copp in fact was applying the flow of commerce
test.70
The application of the flow of commerce theory depends on
whether the goods retain their interstate nature considering the
facts, circumstances, and economics of the particular industry The
standard is whether the "goods sent across state lines at a prior
time remain within the 'practical, economic continuity' of the interstate transaction at the time of the subsequent intrastate sale." 1
The test is not satisfied when ingredients or raw materials are
shipped into a state for subsequent processing, which takes the
goods out of the flow of commerce.72 The test is satisfied and the
commodities are in commerce if they are shipped into a state from
elsewhere and resold substantially unchanged within that state immediately or after temporary storage.73
In Roorda, the court held that gasoline refined in New York and
sold to plaintiff and its competitors in that state, but not across the
state lines, was without the jurisdiction of the Act. The court, however, concluded that to dismiss the complaint until plaintiff had
the opportunity to show that some of the gasoline was refined in
74
Texas and shipped by pipeline to New York was premature.
70. Id. at 942. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195, 198 (1974).
71. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974); Walker Oil Co. v.
Hudson Oil Co. of Missouri, 414 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042
(1970).
72. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); Scranton Constr. Co. v. Litton
Indus. Leasing Corp., 493 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 1974); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d
175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 715
(7th Cir. 1968); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
959 (1965); Red Apple Supermarket, Inc. v. Deltown Foods, Inc., 419 F Supp. 1256
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
73. See Perry v. Amerada Hess Corp., 427 F Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
74. The court m Roorda considered that such cases as McGoffin v. Sun Oil Co., 539 F.2d
1245 (10th Cir. 1976), Bacon v. Texaco, Inc., 503 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1974), and Borden Co. v.
FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964), merely stood for the proposition that goods or commodities made and sold in one state at discriminatory prices are not subject to the proscriptions
of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 446 F Supp. at 944-45. The Fifth, Seventh and Tenth
Circuits, even before Copp, required at least one leg of the alleged discriminatory sales to
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A recent decision on the jurisdictional scope of the Act that is of
special interest because it is a post-A&P decision is Paceco, Inc. v.
Ishikawajima-HanmaHeavy Industries Co. 7 5 In Paceco, the district

court denied defendants' motion to dismiss a section 2(f) complaint
alleging that they were able to purchase steel directly from Japanese steel companies at a price lower than that charged plaintiff by
domestic wholesalers who purchased steel from the same companies. The complaint alleged that defendants, as favored customers,
could outbid plaintiff on domestic contracts for large steel cranes
used to unload ship containers. It further alleged that the steel was
shipped to the United States in a relatively unchanged condition
where the cranes were assembled without any substantial altering
or processing. 7 In other words, the Paceco complaint was premised
on the continued viability of the flow of commerce theory
Of importance is that the court in Paceco recognized that different jurisdictional requirements govern sections 2(a) and 2(f) of the
Act. For section 2(a) to apply, the seller must be engaged in commerce, the discrimination must be made in the course of com-77
merce, and one of the purchases involved must be in commerce.
Section 2(f), however, provides that the buyer who is charged with
knowingly inducing or receiving a discriminatory price must be engaged in commerce. Consequently, to prosecute a buyer theoretically is more difficult than to prosecute a seller under the Robinson-Patman Act. The section 2(f) requirement is satisfied when the
buyer purchases from a seller located in another state although the
buyer resells the commodity locally, because the purchase transaction clearly would be in the "course of such commerce." But the
cross a state line. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1116 (1973); Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972).
75. 468 F Supp. 256 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
76. This allegation had to be accepted for purposes of passing on the motion to dismiss.
Id. at 258. See Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v.
FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); Baldwin Hills Bldg. Material
Co. v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 283 F Supp. 202 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
77. Although the jurisdictional requirement of § 2(a) is tripartite, the critical element is
that one of the challenged sales must be in commerce. It automatically follows that if one of
those sales is made in commerce, the first two requirements are satisfied. See Liquilux Gas
Serv. v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F Supp. 414, 416 n.2 (D.P.R. 1969). It long has been settled
that whether the higher or lower priced sale is the interstate transaction is irrelevant. See
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).

1979]

IT ONCE AGAIN TAKES TWO TO TANGO

same buyer might not be culpable under section 2(f) if the seller is
located in the buyer's state because the buyer is not engaged "in
commerce" even if the seller violates section 2(a) by selling at
78
higher prices to the favored buyer's out-of-state competitors. Of
course, the courts could harmonize seller and buyer liability in the
same transaction notwithstanding the literal language of section
2(f);79 but, given the approach of the Supreme Court reflected m
A&P, this is less likely than it formerly was.
The court in Paceco was more sanguine on this point. It recognized the anomaly between the commerce requirements of sections
2(a) and 2(f) and that the "plain reading" of the language of section 2(f) would require that the wrongdoing buyer receive the discrimination in the course of commerce." It posited, however, that
the emphasis on the derivative nature of section 2(f) and the absence of any logical reason for intentionally creating favorable
treatment for buyers" would require a liberal reading of section 2(f)
to impose no other requirements than those in section 2(a) What
the court in Paceco seems to have ignored is that, although A&P
does make the section 2(f) violation totally derivative, the Court
constantly emphasized the "plain meaning" and clear language of
section 2(f) 82 A Court so concerned with the plain meaning of the
liability elements of the provision seemingly would be equally concerned with the "plain meaning" of the jurisdictional element. Of
course, consistency is neither the hallmark of the Robinson-Patman
Act itself nor of the courts that have construed it.
The court in Paceco rejected the argument that section 2(f) required a defendant to purchase commodities from an American
supplier," and hence refused to construe the jurisdictional scope of
78. See, e.g., Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 184 F Supp. 312, 319
(N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 368 U.S. 829 (1961). For a discussion of the commerce requirement of § 2(f), see generally F ROWE, supra note 2, § 14.6; 16D
VON YKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 36.04.
79. Rowe suggests that courts might harmonize the jurisdictional requirements of §§ 2(a)
and 2(f) and notes that such a construction would obviate recourse to § 5 of the FTC Act.
Section 5 could be applied against the local buyer who induced the discriminatory price
because the discrimination would prejudice buyers in other states, even before the jurisdictional scope of that provision was broadened to the outer boundary of the commerce clause
by the Magnuson-Moss Act. F RowE, supra note 2, at 437-38.
80. 468 F Supp. at 259 n.7.
81. See generally 16D VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 36.04.
82. See text accompanying notes 200-02 tnfra.
83. 468 F Supp. at 259 n.5.
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the provision so narrowly that it could not cover sales made in Japan. The court applied the flow of commerce test and concluded
that "a sale across state lines can carry the flow back to the initial
shipment of the goods after manufacture and carry the flow forward to transformation or storage in the state of resale, embracing
every transaction in between." 4 Thus, a subsequent transaction in
commerce could bring into the "flow" an earlier transaction such
as a sale of steel in Japan even though on its own the earlier transaction would not be viewed as being within commerce for purposes
of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The court also accepted, at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss, that the allegation the steel purchased by defendants was
used in the United States satisfied the requirement of section 2(a)
that the commodities inust be sold for "use, consumption, or resale, within the United States." 5 Unless the steel purchased at
lower prices ended up in the United States in some form, the Act
would not apply 56
The defendants also failed m contending the complaint should
be dismissed because Paceco did not allege that it was a direct purchaser of steel from the Japanese steel manufacturers. The court
recognized that Klein v. Lionel Corp. 7 and Wales Home Remodel5 established that only actual
ing Co. v. Alside Aluminum Corp."
purchasers can maintain a section 2(a) suit, but concluded that
those cases did not preclude an indirect purchaser from maintaining a section 2(a) action alleging that his wholesale supplier was a
victim of discriminatory prices, vis-6-vis the plaintiff's competitors. The court distinguished Klein and Wales on the ground that
the complaints alleged that plaintiffs' wholesalers received the
same prices as plaintiffs' direct buying retailer competitors, and
not that they, the wholesalers, were victims of price discrimination.
In other words, the plaintiffs in Klein and Wales were complaining
84. 468 F Supp. at 259 (quoting 1 P AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 233 (1978)).
85. 468 F Supp. at 260.
86. See Fimex Corp. v. Barmatic Prods. Co., 429 F Supp. 978, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (§
2(a) does not apply where one purchaser, presumably the favored purchaser, exported all
products bought for resale); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F Supp.
244, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (§ 2(a) does not apply to defendant's sales of consumer goods in
Japan at higher prices than the goods were sold in the United States).
87. 138 F Supp. 560 (D. Del.), aff'd, 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
88. 443 F Supp. 908, 911-12 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
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that they were not being treated the same as their competitors because the manufacturers refused to sell to them directly, whereas
in Paceco, the plaintiff was complaining of injuries suffered because of the discrimination against the steel wholesalers. In effect,
the court considered Klein and Wales as overstating the rule and
construed the language in section 2(a) prohibiting discrimnations
in price "between different purchasers" as referring only to the parties who paid the discriminatory prices and not to the standing of
89
the "victim" of the discrimination.
The view of the court in Paceco that an "indirect" purchaser
such as the plaintiff would have standing to bring a Robinson-Patman action appears somewhat tenuous.'" To be sure, some cases
reject a strict actual purchaser rule,9" and the Supreme Court in
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.,9 2 a section 2(a) case, and FTC v. Fred
Meyer, Inc.,9 3 a section 2(d) promotional allowance case, indicated
that any statutory construction of the Robinson-Patman Act requires a broad look at the purpose of the Act to end injury resulting
from the proscribed discriminatory conduct. Though the court may
be correct in its reading of Perkins and Fred Meyer, the question is
whether those cases would reach the same result if brought today
before a Supreme Court seemingly determined to restrict the scope
of the Robinson-Patman Act. Of course, the Court might accept
the logical position taken in Paceco that the issue of standing
under the Robinson-Patman Act should focus on substantive questions of causation and injury
Heeding the Supreme Court's observation that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust cases, 94 the
court in Paceco rejected the defendants' argument that an indirect
purchaser could not show as a matter of law 'injury to competition,
an element of a section 2(f) case,95 because of plaintiff's allegation
89. 468 F Supp. at 261.
90. See generally 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 127-29; F RowE, supra note 2,

§ 4.5.
91. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1116 (1973); Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362, 377-78
(N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
92. 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
93. 390 U.S. 341 (1968). Cf. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 175 (1960) (proscribing "indirect" brokerage payments by independent broker).
94. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
95. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
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that the price discrimination in favor of the defendant crane manufacturers permitted them to outbid it on contracts. It recognized
that cases such as Secatore's Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co.'s have
permitted suppliers to discriminate in favor of consumer customers
when the disfavored retailer could not compete for the consumer's
business even if he paid the same price. 7 The court may have entertamed doubts whether the particular discrimination injured
competition but believed that Paceco should have an opportunity
to show that it could compete with the defendants even after absorbing the wholesalers' surcharge if the American steel wholesalers
had not been "victimized" by discrimination. 8
Red Apple Supermarkets, Inc. v. Deltown Foods, Inc.9" is one recent decision taking a narrow view of the jurisdictional scope of
section 2(a) In Red Apple, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the New York producer of a type of
lowfat milk that was made by blending dry nonfat milk solids with
raw whole milk and liquid skim milk could not be charged with an
illegal price discrimination under the Act simply because some of
the raw whole milk came from Pennsylvania. Red Apple had alleged merely that Deltown's discriminatory sales were made in interstate commerce and did not demonstrate or even assert that any
actual purchases crossed a state line in satisfaction of the third jurisdictional element of section 2(a) Red Apple contended that the
lowfat milk was still in the flow or stream of commerce. This contention, however, was rejected because the early cases relied on as
requiring the term "purchases in commerce" to include the entire
stream of commerce ' ° were restricted by the narrow jurisdictional
interpretation of Copp. The court noted that no Second Circuit decision approving the itream of commerce analysis in Robinson-Patman Act cases was cited ' and that even the Fifth Circuit had re96. 171 F Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959).
97. In effect, if equality in price cannot help the disfavored purchaser, and equality is all
that is required by the Act, then the price discrimination cannot be said to injure
competition.
98. See Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F Supp. 345, 355 (E.D.N.Y.
1960). See also Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F Supp. 942 (D. Conn. 1966).
99. 419 F Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
100. Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC,
348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); Olympia Food Market, Inc. v.
Sheffield Farms Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 68,064 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

101. 419 F Supp. at 1258. Red Apple, of course, was decided before A&P wherein the
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stricted the broad sweep of the Foremost Dairies decision in
Hampton v. Graff Vending Co.'0 '
The court's analysis of Hampton in Red Apple seems questionable. Hampton did not restrict Foremost Dairies because, as the
opinion pointed out, the earlier decision recognized the limits of
the flow of commerce theory "I This does not mean the court in
Hampton did not acknowledge the impact of Copp upon the interpretation of the Act. The court recognized that between the time of
an earlier decision in Hampton'4 and the instant case, Copp substantially had overruled Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co.,'0 ' wherein the
use of profits from interstate activities to finance local price-cutting
was considered sufficient to satisfy the "in commerce" requirement
of the Act. The Littlejohn position was based on the dictum in
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.,'"8 which the Court in Copp
clearly rejected.
Furthermore, as was noted in A&P,' any discussion of the continued vitality of the flow of commerce theory in Red Apple was
irrelevant because the product sold in New York differed substantially from the Pennsylvania raw milk that was but one of its ingredients; the flow of commerce theory is premised on no more than a
negligible change in the commodity once it enters a state.,"8 The
possibility does exist, of course, that the court in Red Apple was
Second Circuit accepted a flow of commerce analysis.
102. 516 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1975).
103. Id. at 102-03. See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 677-78 (5th Cir.), cert.
dented, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
104. Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 478 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1973).

105. 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972).
106. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
107. 557 F.2d at 979-80. But see Rohrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas.

60,352 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (applying the Copp requirement in a § 2(c) brokerage case).
108. Red Apple, which involved the production of lowfat milk, was closer to cases such as
Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 287 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 829 (1961), in which the product, ice cream, was substantially different and richer
in butterfat than the milk that had previously moved in interstate commerce, and Belliston
v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 408 U.S. 928 (1972), in which crude oil
had been shipped from Colorado to Utah where it was refined and sold as gasoline.

Of course, when a manufacturer sells to autonomous distributors who resell only within
the state, the flow of commerce clearly has ceased. Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A&S Tropical,
Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co.,
390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curtain); Roorda v. American Oil Co., 446 F Supp. 939

(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (denying summary judgment because the fact question of the relationship
of the distributor defendant and American Oil Co. could be resolved only by trial).
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more attuned to the current philosophy of the Supreme Court
than, for example, the courts in Paceco and Roorda.
THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION ISSUE

After rejecting A&P's jurisdictional challenge, the Second Circuit
considered whether the FTC had established a prima facie violation of section 2(f) by showing the knowing inducement or receipt
by A&P of an illegal discriminatory price. The court noted that,
under the holding of Automattc Canteen, the emphasis in a section
2(f) case is on the culpability of the buyer and not merely the receipt of a favorable price."0 9 To paraphrase the Court, a.buyer violates section 2(f) when he knows the price induced or received was
illegal or knows that it was not within one of the defenses available
to the seller.' 0
Under Kroger most buyers, but under A&P all buyers, are liable
under section 2(f) only when the price knowingly induced or received is prohibited by the "section." That is, the ultimate liability
of the buyer depends on the presence of a section 2(a) violation by
the seller."' In addition to satisfying the jurisdictional commerce
requirements, including the requirement that the items involved
109. The initial FTC enforcement of § 2(f), which was not extensive, emphasized the receipt of the favorable price. See discussion of the early § 2(f) cases in C. EDWARDs, supra
note 17, at 486-501.
110. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953). The rule is of
solace to buyers in that the Court did not feel it was an undue burden on a plaintiff, whether
a private party or the FTC, to show that the defendant buyer was "not an unsuspecting
recipient of prohibited discriminations." Id. at 81. The FTC disagreed and dismissed a number of § 2(f) cases after Automatic Canteen was decided. See 16D VON KALINOWsKi, supra
note 2, § 36.0511], at 36-65 n.7. Upon reflection, however, the FTC realized that Automatic
Canteen involved only the issue of the burden of introducing evidence and this burden could
be satisfied by showing that a buyer had reasonable knowledge as to the illegality of the
seller's price.
Consequently, when the Commission realized the burden was not as onerous as originally
thought, it began to file new § 2(f) proceedings. Unfortunately, these actions often were
brought against small buyers who had banded together to get favorable price treatment in
order to compete against large buyers. In the opinion of this author, such actions constituted
a perversion of the basic purposes of an Act intended to respond to the conduct of the socalled "power buyer." See, e.g., D.&N. Auto Parts Co., 55 F.T.C. 1279 (1959), aff'd sub nor.
Mid-South Distrib. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961).
For a general discussion of the burden of proof requirements under § 2(f), see C. AusTIN,
supra note 2, at 158-64; D. BAUM, supra note 2, at 70-73; C. EnWARDs, supra note 17, at 50111; 1975 DEWLOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 159-62; F RowE, supra note 2, § 14.7; 16D VON
KALiNOWSKI, supra note 2, § 36.05.
111. See note 4 supra.

19791

IT ONCE AGAIN TAKES TWO TO TANGO

must be sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any territory thereof, 1 2 the threshold elements of a section 2(a) violation are as follows: there must be two or more consummated sales; ' of commodities;"' of like grade and quality;,"
made at discriminatory, that is, different prices;"' by the same
112. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976), defines "commerce" as including
trade with foreign nations. Thus, the specific language of § 2(a) exempts export sales discriminations, but such sales may be subject to other provisions of the Act. See, e.g., Baysoy
v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950) (holding that an export sales agreement
violated the brokerage provision of § 2(c)). Import sales are covered by the Act. See, e.g., In
re Siemens & Halske A.G., Berlin, Germany, 155 F Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also
cases cited at note 86 supra. See generally 16C VoN KALNOWSKI, supra note 2, §§ 26.01[l],
26.03.
113. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947); Atalanta
Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1958). Individual refusals to deal by a
seller are not actionable as discriminations under a specific proviso of § 2(a), Shaw's Inc. v.
Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939), but concerted refusals to deal are actionable
under the Sherman Act. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
114. "Commodities" include tangible goods or products, but not services. See, e.g., Baum
v. Investors Diversified Serv., Inc., 409 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1969); Rea v. Ford Motor Co.,
355 F Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974); Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1963). For an extensive list of cases
classifying various items as commodities or noncommodities, see 16B VON KAINOWSKI, supra
note 2, § 24.05.
115. Conflicting views on the proper criteria for determining like grade and quality were
resolved in favor of the objective "physical characteristics" test in FTC v. Borden Co., 383
U.S. 637 (1966). The courts and the FTC recognize that physically dissimilar products are
not of like grade and quality. See, e.g., Lubbock Glass & Mirror Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 313 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Universal-Rundle Corp., 65 F.T.C. 924, 95455 (1964), orderset aside and remanded on other grounds, 352 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 387 U.S. 244 (1967).
Although consumer preferences are irrelevant if the products are physically identical, they
are appropriate in evaluating whether a minor physical difference is "merely decorative or
fanciful" or in fact affects the marketability of the product. See, e.g., Pacific Eng'r & Prod.
Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,054 (D. Utah 1974); Central Ice Cream Co.
v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 184 F Supp. 312 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 265 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961); Universal-Rundle Corp., 65 F.T.C. 924, 954-55
(1964), order set aside and remanded on other grounds, 352 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 387 U.S. 244 (1967). See generally Galanti, supra note 1, at
984-86.
116. There were divergent views as to the exact scope and meaning of "discrimination"
under the Robinson-Patman Act until the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), which held that "a price discrimination within the meaning
of [§ 2(a)] is merely a price difference." Id. at 549. Thus, the Court rejected the authorities
and commentators who contended that predatory intent or competitive injury were prerequisites to a statutory "price discrimination." The Court also decided against those economists
who urged that economic discrimination exists "when the profit contribution is not the same
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seller;" 7 to two or more different purchasers; 1 s and in reasonably
close temporal proximity "I The Robinson-Patman Act does not
for all sales of a product; some sales are more profitable than others." Backman, An Economist Looks at the Robinson-PatmanAct, 17 ABA ANTTRUST SECTMON 343, 344 (1960). Thus,
to an economist, economic price discrimination does not necessarily follow from differing
prices; such discrimination, however, may exist even though prices are the same. See generally 16C voN KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, §§ 27.01-.02.
117. See, e.g., Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co., 414 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1969); National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955); Massachusetts Brewers Ass'n v. P
Ballantine & Sons, 129 F Supp. 736 (D. Mass. 1955). The requirement that the sales be
made by the "same seller" seems to provide an easy opportunity to avoid the proscriptions
of the Act by the simple expedient of a manufacturer reserving to itself favorite customers
who will receive preferential price treatment while dealing with disfavored customers
through a selling subsidiary. This stratagem, in fact, has worked. It is not without risk,
however, because in order to avoid liability, the subsidiary must have substantial independence in setting prices in terms of sales-probably more independence than exists in the real
world of parent-subsidiary relationships.
Neither share ownership, Warren Petroleum Corp., 53 F.T.C. 268 (1956), nor common directors or officers, National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Balm & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F Supp. 541
(E.D.N.Y. 1957), standing alone are sufficient to make the parent accountable for discriminatory sales. If, however, the parent corporation actively controls or contributes to the subsidiary's. pricing or distribution policy, disregarding the corporate fiction will be justified.
The parent-seller assumes another risk. If it successfully shows that it did not control its
subsidiary, it might be liable for direct discrimination between different purchasers or customers if the subsidiary receives price or allowance benefits not available to others. Cf. Balm
& Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F Supp. 541, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (holding manufacturer
not liable for price discrimination under Robinson-Patman Act when prices established by
distributor). For an analysis of the cases involving the "single seller" issue, see 16B voN
KALiNOWSKI, supra note 2, § 24.04[2][a], particularly the guidelines, td. § 24.04, at 24-45, 2446.
118. Determining whether a person is a "purchaser" for Robinson-Patman Act purposes
usually presents no problem, but circumstances exist in which purchasers from wholesalers
or distributors will be deemed "indirect purchasers" from the manufacturer. Hiram Walker,
Inc. v. A&S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); KraftPhenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). The key to application of the indirect purchaser
doctrine is the manufacturer's control over the sales policies of the distributor even if they
are ostensibly unrelated. The supplier who is responsible for the prices of the distributor will
be held accountable for any resulting competitive injury. The "indirect purchaser" doctrine
essentially complements the "single seller" doctrine applied to parent-subsidiary relationships, and the same factors are considered in determining whether the requisite control exists. Cf. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968) (holding application of indirect purchaser doctrine unnecessary because "customers" in § 2(d) includes retailers who buy
through wholesalers and compete with direct buyers of the supplier's product). See generally
F RowE, supra note 2, § 4.5; 16B VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 24.04[3].
119. Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958); Valley Plymouth v.
Studebaker-Packard Corp., 219 F Supp. 608, 610 (S.D. Cal. 1963). Essentially, the requirement is satisfied if both the sale agreements and the delivery of the commodities occur approximately simultaneously. "Closeness" rather than precise simultaneity is required. Hart-
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apply to transactions such as leases or consignments, provided the
12
transactions are not disguised sales. 1
One of the essential threshold inquiries in a Robmson-Patman
Act proceeding, therefore, is whether the commodities are of like
grade and quality The need for this element as a means of confining the price discrimimation law to reasonably comparable business
transactions is self-evident. Although the wisdom of ignoring brand
names and trademark differences in considering whether commodities are of like grade and quality has been questioned, 21 the Supreme Court has held that the test of like grade and quality is the
physical identity or characteristics of the commodities involved
and that economic factors and consumer preferences are not to be
considered in passing on this element. 22 In A&P, no like grade and
quality issue was presented because the private label milk sold to
A&P was physically and chemically identical to the Borden brand

milk. 123
The elements listed above are threshold elements; even if all are
satisfied, a price discrimination1 24 will not violate section 2(a) unley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916, 921 (5th Cir. 1962). Otherwise,
the Robinson-Patman Act would be effectively emasculated.
120. See, e.g., Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile
Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F Supp. 400, 403, 404 (W.D. Pa. 1963). An
"agency" or "consignment" label will not insulate a transaction that in fact is a sale. Westem Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1963). For an extensive analysis of
the factors considered in resolving this issue, see 16B voN KAinowsKi, supra note 2, §
24.03[2].
121. The commentators were so prolific on this point that m FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S.
637 (1966), the Supreme Court engaged in a battle of footnotes-the majority emphasizing
the numbers, id. at 640 n.3, and the dissenters urging that most of the supportive writings
were not relevant. Id. at 652 n.8. See also 16C VON KAuNowsKi, supra note 2, § 25.01, at 25-3
n.2.
122. FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966). Economic factors and consumer preferences,
however, may be considered m the context of the more flexible injury to competition issue;
in fact, Borden ultimately prevailed in the case because the discrimination in price between
the brand name and the private label condensed milk did not cause the requisite injury to
competition. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Continental Baking
Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973).
123. 87 F.T.C. at 981-82.
124. Although a price discrimination is the same as a price difference, the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply to every situation in which a seller nets less from one customer than
from another. For example, in Kapiolanl Motors, Ltd. v. General Motors Corp., 337 F Supp.
102 (D. Hawaii 1972), the court held that false and fraudulent warranty claims that reduced
General Motor's net receipts from sales to a dealer might have stated a prima facie case of
obtaining money by false pretenses, fraud, conversion, and the like, but not a price discnmi-
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less it has the prescribed adverse effect on competition. That is, it
is unlawful only when its effect "may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce"" ' or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who "grants" the discrimination, 2 ' with any person who
"knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination,' 27 or with
"customers of either of them."' 2 The Act does not preclude selling
at different prices to customers who clearly occupy different places
in the distribution chain.'21 It does preclude indirect price discriminations that have the requisite competitive impact.' ° The key word
in the statutory standard by which the impact of price discriminations is to be judged is "may " The term does not mean a "mere"
or "remote possibility" of substantially lessening competition;' 3'
nation because "[n]owhere in the legislative history of the Act does it indicate that Congress
was wored about purchasers who would engage in fraud, misrepresentation, or actual stealing from suppliers to procure economic advantages only secondarily relevant to 'net price.'"

Id. at 103.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
126. Id. This is the so-called primary line or seller level injury.
127. Id. This is the so-called secondary line or customer level injury.
128. Id. This is the so-called tertiary line or customer's buyer level injury. See Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222 (1970).
129. See, e.g., Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F Supp. 942, 950 (D. Conn. 1966); Krug v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956); Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C.
169 (1955). See generally F RowE, supra note 2, at 174-75; 16C VON KALINOWSKi, supra note
2, § 30.02[2]. Discounts granted to dual function distributors, that is, wholesalers who also
retail, may be challenged successfully under § 2(a) if not cost justified. See, e.g., Mueller Co.
v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); E. Edelmann & Co.,
51 F.T.C. 978 (1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958).
Also, arrangements m which direct buying customers farther down the chain obtain greater
discounts than those available to customers higher up may be challenged under § 2(a). See,
e.g., Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).
130. For examples of condemned indirect price discriminations, see Skinner v. United
States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956) (credit terms); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir.. 1951) (freight allowance); Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 171 F Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959) (withdrawal of credit). Indirect price
discriminations must be distinguished from promotional allowances cognizable under §§
2(d) and 2(e) of the Act. Although the line is not very clear, the key to determining which
provisions apply is whether the allowances or payments are connected with resale of the
goods by the buyer, so that §§ 2(d) and 2(e) would apply, or are incidental to the initial sale
so that § 2(a) would apply. See Chicago Spring Prod. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 254
F Supp. 83, 84-85 (N.D. ill.), afT'd, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966) (per curiam). In CentexWinston Corp. v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 447 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 405
U.S. 921 (1972), discriminatory delays in delivery were held cognizable under § 2(e).
131. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Corn Prods.
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945); American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir.
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rather, the interpretation of "may" has ranged from "reasonable
possibility"'' 3 1 to "reasonably probable"' 3 depending on the forum
and the circumstances.
As is frequently the case in determining whether certain conduct
is proscribed by a statute, both easy and difficult cases arise. In the
context of price discrimination the easy cases are the primary line
cases in which predatory pricing is shown and the secondary line
cases in which the price concessions are great. In the primary line
cases, to conclude that competition has been injured when the
seller has engaged in predatory pricing aimed at destroying his
competitors is not difficult.134 Similarly, it is easy to conclude that
competition has been injured when a favored buyer continuously
has received a thirty percent price reduction that would benefit
him vis-A-vis his competitors regardless whether he passed on his
135
savings or simply increased his profits.

In the difficult primary line cases m which no predatory pricing
has occurred, an examination of the vitality of the competitive system is necessary to determine if the discrimination had the requisite effect. Although they do not establish a per se violation,"' a
diversion of trade or a loss of customers are factors considered by
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964). See generally 1975-DEvELoPMENTS, supra note 2, at
116-25; 16C VON KALNOWsm, supra note 2, § 28.05.
132. The leading case authority favoring this construction is FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37, 50 (1948). The test was reaffirmed impliedly in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). See also American Motors Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247, 251 (6th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1012 (1968); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
133. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959
(1965). The FTC itself now seems generally inclined toward the "reasonably probable" test.
See,e.g., Fred Bronner Corp., 57 F.T.C. 771 (1960); General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 887
(1954). See generally cases cited in 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 117 n.79.
134. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 843
(7th Cir. 1961). Decisions involving predatory pricing and the factors used in evaluating the
intent of the seller are discussed in 16C VON KALiNOWsKi, supra note 2, § 29.02[2].
135. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); Whitaker Cable Corp. v.
FTC, 239 F.2d 253, 255 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957) (discounts up to
30%). For a detailed analysis of the factors used in the evaluation of competitive effects at
the buyer or secondary level, see 16C VON KALiNOWSKI, supra note 2, § 31.01[4].
136. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206
(1952). For a general discussion of the "diversion theory," see 16C VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 2, § 29.03[l].
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the courts and the FTC.131 Another important factor used to measure the impact of price discrimination on seller-level competition
is the loss of profits by competitors.1 3 The structure of the particular market, including the number and strength of the competitors,
the availability of lower prices from others, and even the relationship between the seller's two prices when the higher price subsidizes operations in the affected market also have been examined.,"
The difficult secondary line cases are those involving the propriety of utilizing the "inference technique" established in FTC v.
Morton Salt Co.' 0 Under Morton Salt, competitive injury may be
inferred when profit margins are small and the industry is highly
competitive, notwithstanding that the discounts involved are relatively insignificant and that no actual evidence exists that disfavored retailers lost business or suffered financial loss.4 ' The technique is difficult to defend against; even direct testimony by
unfavored customers that they were not injured by unfavorable
prices has been found legally insufficient to protect the seller in a
42
section 2(a) proceeding.
If the inference technique is inappropriate, the courts and the
137. See, e.g., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 68 F.T.C. 217, 260 (1965), afl'd, 371 F.2d 277 (7th
Cir. 1966).
138. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co., Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Volasco Prods.
Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 346 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1965); H.J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-nut
Life Savers, Inc., 181 F Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally 16C VON KALiNOWSKI,
supra note 2, § 29.03[2].
139. The so-called "war chest" theory is more likely to be an issue in the predatory primary line cases. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). It continues
to be a factor, however, in other cases to support a conclusion that § 2(a) has not been
violated. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FrC, 289 F.2d 835, 842 (7th Cir. 1961); Balian
Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 231 F.2d 356
(9th Cir. 1955), cert. dented, 350 U.S. 991 (1956). See generally 16C VON KALNOWSKI, supra
note 2, §§ 29.03[3]-[4].
140. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
141. For a general discussion of Morton Salt and its progeny, see 16C VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 2, §§ 31.01[2][al-[b], 31.04[4]. See also 1975 DEVLOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 117;
F Rows, supra note 2, at 180-86.
142. See United Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 926 (1966). Of course, testimony that the disfavored customers were not injured
might mean that they were injured but, for whatever reasons, were not complaining. For
other cases resit.ring such rebuttal evidence, see Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265
F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); Moog Indus. Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43
(8th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), aff'd sub
nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). See also
16C VON KALNOWSKI, supra note 2, § 31.01[2][c].
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FTC will attempt to determine whether the price discrimination
has impaired the competitive abilities of unfavored customers-'4
The health of the competitive process at the customer level is ascertamed by examining the temporary or permanent nature of the
discrimination, the causal nexus between the discrimination and
alleged injury, and even the general availability of the challenged
lower prices."'
The Second Circuit had no difficulty affirming the FTC's conclusion that the higher prices paid by A&P's competitors for milk substantially identical to that purchased by A&P were injurious to
competition. The price discriminations ranged up to twenty-two
and one-half percent in the retail grocery business, which has notoriously low profit margins. Moreover, A&P admitted that fluid milk
was one of the most important commodities carried in retail grocery stores and sometimes was used as a price leader to draw customers to a store.' Thus, substantial evidence supported the findings of the FTC that a reasonable possibility and even a reasonable
probability of the adverse effect on competition existed. "6 The Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of injury to competition; in
fact, its emphasis on A&P's right to rely on Borden's meeting competition defense was a tacit acknowledgment that the prices did
injure competition.
Section 2(f) does not specifically provide that the buyer must
have actual or constructive knowledge that section 2(a) prohibits
the price differential given by the seller. The provision could be
construed to impose liability on a buyer who knowingly induces or
receives prices lower than those charged other buyers that m fact
are illegal even if the buyer is unaware of the illegality The requirement that the plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with
evidence of the buyer's knowledge of the illegality of the price was
143. See, e.g., Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967); American Oil Co. v. FTC,
325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
144. See cases cited at note 143 supra. See generally F RowE, supra note 2, §§ 8.3-.5;
16C VON KAL NowsKI, supra note 2, §§ 31.03[3] - [4].

145. 557 F.2d at 980-81.
146. The findings of the Commission as to the facts are deemed conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1976). See FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S.
746, 760 (1945); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 73 (1934); Foremost Daires, Inc.
v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); Callaghan & Co. v. FTC,
163 F.2d 359, 372 (2d Cir. 1947).
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a gloss imparted by the Supreme Court's decision in Automatic
Canteen Co. of America v. FTC.'4 7 Thus, the plaintiff must make
two showings: that the defendant was paying a price that differed
from that paid by other buyers that was neither cost justified nor
otherwise defensible; and that the defendant knew or should have

known that the differential would have the effect of substantially

48
lessening competition.'
On its face, to require a showing that the buyer had knowledge of
the illegality of the price would seem to be an insurmountable burden. Automatic Canteen, however, supplied the means of overcoming this obstacle by noting that the buyer's "trade experience"''
could be used to show his knowledge of the illegality Trade experience is a somewhat amorphous concept. Simply stated, it is the
expertise of a skilled purchasing manager who knows a great deal
about the going price for the commodities being purchased. The
FTC and the courts have developed some standards in this respect."" For example, the burden has been met in a proceeding
against a large volume buyer when the FTC showed the following:
none of the suppliers granted quantity discounts as a matter of
course; the favored customer received the discounts only during the
month it conducted a special coupon promotional sale; and the
price concessions amounted to a full one-third off the regular price
whereas cost savings to the sellers were, at best, negligible. 5' It also
has been satisfied in cases in which buyers have formed buying
147. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
148. Id. at 74-75. The substantiality of the discount alone does not satisfy the lessening
competition requirement, but a showing of a significant discrimination in a highly competitive industry with low profit margins often can satisfy the burden. See generally 1975 DVELopmms, supra note 2, at 121. With a few exceptions, this is the generally accepted rule even
if the Morton Salt "inference technique" is applicable. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37
(1948). See authorities listed in 16C VON KAuNowsKI, supra note 2, § 31.011], at 31-8 n.23.
The Second and possibly the Ninth Circuits take the position that any discrimination
among competing buyers is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under § 2(a) and that
the seller has the burden of disproving competitive injury to the seller. See Fowler Mfg. Co.
v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. dented, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970); Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Samuel H.
Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
149. 346 U.S. at 79-80.
150. See C. EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 515-17; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 160;
16C VON KAuiowsKi, supra note 2, § 36.05[3][c].
151. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 363-67 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
390 U.S. 341 (1968).

1979]

IT ONCE AGAIN TAKES TWO TO TANGO

groups and paid lower prices for their purchases although the
mode, quantity, or quality of their individual purchases remained
unchanged.'52
The Second Circuit in A&P easily concluded that A&P's trade
experience sufficed to establish that it knew Borden's prices on the
private label milk products violated section 2(a) 151 The Supreme
Court also accepted that Borden's prima facie violation of section
2(a) had been established and that a prima facie violation of section 2(a) necessarily implied a prima facie violation of section 2(f)
AvAmABiTrY OF DEFENSES TO

A&P

The two courts, however, disagreed on the issue of the availability to A&P of the statutory defenses that would have been available to Borden had it been charged with a section 2(a) violation. In
other words, the courts disagreed m their interpretations of the
statement in Automatic Canteen that "a buyer is not liable under
§ 2(f) if the lower prices he induces are either within one of the
seller's defenses such as the cost justification or not known by him
54
not to be within one of those defenses."
55
The cost justification defense' is absolute' 5' in a section 2(a)
case when the differential makes only due allowance for actual cost
savings from the manufacture, sale, or delivery of the commodities,
even if the price discrimination results in an injury to competition.
A seller also can escape liability when the lower price offered to any
152. See American Motors Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 884 (1960). See generally Galanti, supra note 1, at 992-93. See also Mid-South
Distrib. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512, 518-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961).
153. 557 F.2d at 981.
154. 346 U.S. at 74 (emphasis supplied). The admonition also would apply to the final
proviso of § 2(a), which justifies otherwise unlawful price discriminations made in response
to changing conditions affecting the market for the goods concerned or the marketability of
those goods. The proviso specifically refers to several possibilities, such as a deterioration of
perishable goods and obsolescence of seasonal goods. See generally 16C voN KAlNOWSKI,
supra note 2, § 32.04. Also, the FTC and the courts have recognized, albeit somewhat
vaguely, a de mmimis exception. See E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir.

1956); Alterman Foods, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 298 (1973); American Metal Prods. Co., 60 F.T.C.
1667 (1962).
155. See note 57 supra. A cynical observation about the problems of the cost justification
defense is that in many cases cost justification is considered only after an FTC complaint
has been filed.
156. United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); Automatic Canteen Co. of America
v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 66-69 (1953).
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purchaser "was made m good faith to meet an equally low price of
a competitor."157 The meeting competition defense likewise is
absolute." 8
In order to decide whether Borden's defenses were available to
A&P, the courts had to construe the provision in section 2(f) referring to discrimination in prices that are "prohibited by this section." One interpretation is that the provision makes section 2(f)
totally derivative so the buyer is liable only if the seller is liable
and escapes liability whenever the seller can establish one of his
affirmative defenses, even though the buyer in fact knows the defense is unavailable. The alternative interpretation, based on Kroger, is that the availability of the defenses must be viewed from the
perspective of both buyer and seller so the buyer who knows of the
unavailability of the defense and does not inform the seller is liable
even if the seller is absolved. The Second Circuit adopted the latter
position whereas the Supreme Court held that section 2(f) is
derivative.
A&P invoked both the cost justification and the meeting competition defenses. As to cost justification, the Second Circuit acknowledged that a cost study will not be invalid merely because
one method of computation was used over another,15 as long as the
method selected is as fair and accurate as the next, and that a cost
study made in good faith and in accordance with sound accounting
principles is entitled to great weight.'60 Nonetheless, the court rejected the defense because the three cost studies purporting to
show that Borden's final offer was cost justified were flawed and
unreliable.' 6 '
The court also rejected A&P's argument that the FTC could find
no section 2(f) liability under the standards of Automatic Canteen
without submitting a cost study showing that the prices were not
cost justified; otherwise there would be no "square holding as to
the factual absence of cost justification.""'6 The Second Circuit
157. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). See note 6 supra.
158. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 251 (1951). See also authorities cited in note
34 supra.
159. See FTC v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 371 F.2d 613, 622 (2d Cir. 1967).
160. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 394 (1948).
161. 557 F.2d at 984-85.
162. Id. at 985. But see Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 327 F Supp. 1267 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), affd, 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975).
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read Automatic Canteen as adopting a middle ground approach
that required the FTC to go forward with some evidence of the
buyer's knowledge that the discriminatory prices could not be cost
justified, rather than a rule that the Commission always must
3
prove the absence of cost justification.1
A&P also failed to persuade the Second Circuit that even though
it could not show an actual cost justification, it neither knew nor
had any reason to know, that Borden's prices were not cost justified. "64
' The court concluded that the FTC reasonably could infer
that Borden's letter to A&P, which stated that its prices were
"proper under applicable law" and that it was prepared to defend
them, did not justify A&P's conclusion that the prices generally
were available to other customers of Borden or were cost justified.
The FTC's findings therefore could not be disturbed on appeal." 5
Similarly, the court deemed A&P's argument that the price difference between the private label and the Borden brand milk might
have made A&P suspicious that the brand label prices were too
high, not that the private label prices were too low, to be only an
invitation to retry the facts and draw new references. 66
The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court disagreed as to
whether Borden's potential meeting competition defense was available to A&P as a defense m a section 2(f) proceeding. The court of
appeals did not decide whether Borden m fact would have been
able to defend a section 2(a) action had one been brought; rather,
it decided that even were the defense available to Borden, A&P
could not use it because it knew that Borden's final bid, which substantially exceeded the rival bid, in fact was not sheltered by the
163. 557 F.2d at 985. See also Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd
on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
164. 557 F.2d at 986.
165. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 760 (1945). Furthermore, A&P did not
criticize Borden's cost study prepared during the negotiations indicating losses or minimal
profits on the private label service. This supported the conclusion that both A&P and Borden knew of the illegality of the bargain. 557 F.2d at 986-87. The court also noted that a
formula used by A&P reflecting the general proposition that a dairy can sell milk profitably
for approximately six cents more per quart than the cost for raw milk was relevant but did
not rebut the FTC's prima facie showing of knowledge. Id.
166. Because the Supreme Court accepted A&P's meeting competition defense, it did not
reach the question whether Borden and consequently A&P had a cost justification defense
under § 2(a). 440 U.S. at 85 n.18. Justice White was satisfied that Borden would not have
had a cost justification defense. Id. Justice Marshall did not address the cost justification
issue. Id. at 90 n.4.
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meeting competition defense. 67' The Supreme Court not only reversed the Second Circuit's determination that the meeting competition defense was unavailable to A&P, but also took the unusual
step of determining sua sponte that Borden would have sustained
the defense. Justice White dissented on this issue because neither
the FTC nor the Second Circuit had decided whether Borden itself
had a valid meeting competition defense. He urged that the matter
be remanded to the Commission "whose job it is initially to consider such matters."'' 5 Justice Marshall, dissenting in part, noted
that neither the Administrative Law Judge, the FTC, nor the Second Circuit had determined that Borden was entitled to the meeting competition defense and that both the Administrative Law
Judge and the FTC had suggested the opposite.'69
In order to establish that a lower price to a purchaser was "made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor," a seller
must "show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable
and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price
would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor."'' 0 The
key to the defense is not an absolute certainty that a price concession is being offered to meet an equally low price offered by a competitor, but rather a good faith belief.' 71 Although a seller only can
167. The rival bid would have produced estimated annual savings for A&P of approximately $737,000 as compared with the first Borden bid which would have produced estimated annual savings of $410,000 and the final Borden bid which doubled the predicted
annual savings to $820,000. 440 U.S. at 73 & n.2.
168. 440 U.S. at 85 (White, J., concurring m part and dissenting in part).
169. Id. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). The FTC noted that "[allthough the
Commission decided not to issue a complaint against Borden for violation of Section 2(a),
the Commission has not concluded that Borden would have a valid meeting competition
defense to such a charge." Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 962, 1057 (1976). It further
observed that "[wle believe that it is very probable that Borden did not have such a defense." Id. at 1057 n.19 (emphasis original). The Commission noted that Borden had serious
doubts regarding the legality of the rival bid because it believed the other dairy considered
only direct costs. Contrary to Justice Stewart's indication as to what Borden had done, the
Commission noted that Borden "should have asked A&P for more information about the
competing bid. By not making the request, it was acting imprudently. As the record clearly
indicates, A&P had knowledge of Borden's belief that other dairies might submit bids that
did not include all costs." Id. (citations omitted). Justice Marshall noted that the majority's
action was particularly inappropriate in light of the admonition in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 456 n.31 (1978), that "[tihe case by case interpretation
and elaboration of the § 2(b) defense is properly left to the other federal courts and the FTC
in the context of concrete fact situations." 440 U.S. at 90 n.5.
170. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945).
171. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 453 (1978).
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meet and not beat his competitor's price, 7 2 the requirement was
never draconian.1 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Unted States v.
United States Gypsum Co.,' 74 clearly established that a seller can
assert the defense even if it unknowingly has made a bid that beats
rather than meets the competition.
In A&P, the Supreme Court apparently has so broadened the
concept of "good faith" that the only sellers who might be unable
to establish the defense are those foolish enough to make some effort to substantiate that a lower bid from a competitor was made.
The conventional wisdom was that to be a "prudent businessman
responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a situation of
competitive necessity,' ' 75 a seller had to make such an effort and
that merely taking the buyer's word at face value would not suffice.' 7 ' In A&P, however, the majority held that on the basis of certain statements by A&P's Chicago unit buyer, 7 7 and Borden's fear
of losing its established A&P business, Borden justifiably could
conclude it had to make another bid offering substantial concessions to avoid losing the A&P account. The Court noted Borden's
request for more information had been denied, and that under
Gypsum it could not attempt to verify from its rival the existence
172. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951); National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 70 F.T.C. 79 (1966), aff'd, 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977
(1968).
173. The defense has been interpreted liberally in light of competitive realities and has
been permitted when the seller technically has "beaten" his competitor's price. See, e.g.,
Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden
Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956). In fact, in Kroger,
the FTC recognized that the seller "at least technically 'beat' the competitors" but still
allowed the defense. 76 F.T.C. at 811. The key was the seller's showing of "good faith."
174. 438 U.S. 422, 454 (1978).
175. Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963). See also FTC v. A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759.60 (1945); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
176. See Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255, 259-60 (3d Cir. 1969), wherein the
court concluded that the seller had not shown the requisite good faith in failing to investigate or verify the veracity of a buyer who reported a competitive offer in an oral commumcation and in failing to verify a competitive offer reported by an experienced salesman who had
been with the company for 18 years. In Gypsum, the Court discussed various verification
efforts. 438 U.S. at 453-56.
177. A&P's representative stated, "I have a bid in my pocket. You [Borden] people are so
far out of line it is not even funny. You are not even in the ball park." Pressed for details,
the representative responded only that a $50,000 improvement in Borden's bid "would not
be a drop in the bucket." 440 U.S. at 84.
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and terms of the competing offer.17 8
Unless the majority intended to undercut the standards of "good
faith," its conclusion that it is "virtually inescapable that in making that offer Borden acted in a reasonable and good-faith effort to
meet its competition, and therefore was entitled to a meeting competition defense"'7 9 is hard to explain. This is not to say that Borden, in doubling the estimated annual savings from $410,000 to
$820,000, was not acting in good faith.'80 It is merely to observe
that the Court, in making such a determination on its own without
remand to the FTC, appears to be giving little more than lip service to the requirement that verification efforts are necessary for a
section 2(b) defense.
There is considerable irony in the majority's reliance upon Gypsum wherein the Court held that the exchange of price information
among competitors, even when ostensibly done for Robinson-Patman Act compliance purposes, must remain subject to close Sherman Act scrutiny because such verification efforts easily can be a
cover for hard-core price-fixing.' 8 ' Several commentators on Gypsum, however, have noted that vigorous enforcement of section 2(f)
against buyers is a viable substitute for the interseller corroboration without inhibiting market competition.'82 In fact, the Court in
Gypsum recognized that utilizing section 2(f) against buyers would
"serve to bolster the credibility of buyers' representations and
render reliance thereon by sellers a more reasonable and secure
178. Id. The majority distinguished FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945),
because the "source of the information was a person whose reliability was not questioned
and who had personal knowledge of the competing bid." 440 U.S. at 84 n.17.
179. Id. at 84.
180. The difference between the second Borden bid and the rival bid was $75,000. This
figure is not so substantial that a reasonable person could not conclude that Borden only
incidentally beat its competitor. The only dollar information Borden had when it doubled its
bid, however, was the statement that $50,000 would not be a "drop in the bucket." Considering that $50,000 conceivably might not be "a drop in the bucket" if the rival's estimated
annual savings was, for example, $500,000 and not $735,000, the Supreme Court is giving an
extraordinary amount of leeway to the seller.
181. See Note, Meeting Competition Under the Robtnson-PatmanAct, 90 HARv. L. REv.
1476 (1977).
182. See generally id. at 1495. See also Note, Price Verification Under Robmson-Patman:
The Creation of an Unnecessary "Controlling Circumstance," 58 B.U.L. RIv. 127 (1978) (observing that postcontract verification coupled with the enforcement of § 2(f) might be
acceptable).
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predicate for a finding of good faith under § 2(b) "I"When the two
decisions are viewed together, however, it appears the Court has
engaged in classic circular reasoning: under Gypsum, the seller
need not verify the alleged bid with his competition because section 2(f) will keep the buyer honest; but under A&P, the buyer can
escape liability under section 2(f) as long as he does nothing to give
the seller cause to doubt his word.
The Court could achieve this result only by holding that the
meeting competition defense, at least theoretically available to
Borden, was available to A&P even though at the time of the negotiations A&P knew Borden's second bid substantially bettered the
rival bid such that Borden did not satisfy the meet but not beat
requirement. Denying the defense to A&P, the Second Circuit observed that the FTC decision was premised on Kroger, which held
that the seller's absolution from section 2(a) liability did not ipso
facto exonerate the buyer. According to Justice Clark writing m
Kroger, Automatic Canteen did not warrant or require an interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act that section 2(f) was totally derivative m nature and to so construe the Act "would put a premium on the buyer's artifice and cunning in inducing
discriminatory prices.""4' ' For both the Sixth Circuit in Kroger and
the Second Circuit m A&P, "[i]n order for the buyer to be sheltered through the exoneration of the seller under section 2(b) the
prices induced must come within the defenses of that section not
only from the seller's point of view but also from that of the
buyer.""8 5
The Second Circuit considered this position to be fully consistent
with Automatic Canteen wherein Justice Frankfurter commented
that "the buyer whom Congress in the main sought to reach was
the one who, knowing full well that there was little likelihood of a
defense for the seller, nevertheless proceeded to exert pressure for
183. 438 U.S. at 455 n.30.

184. 438 F.2d at 1377. As one commentator observed, "The teaching of the Kroger case is
that under Section 2(f) the buyer is acting at his peril if he doesn't deal candidly and honestly with his supplier, and if he misrepresents facts m order to get a better price, he probably will be held m violation of Section 2(f) if caught." LaRue, Workshop Discussion:Pricing
and the Robinson-PatmanAct, 41 ANiMusT L.J. 147, 162-63 (1971).

185. 438 F.2d at 1377. In A&P, the Second Circuit stated, "While Borden may well have
been under the impression that the terms of its final offer merely met the Bowman bid, A&P
knew for a fact that the final Borden bid was substantially below 'meeting competition' and
beat the Bowman bid by a good margin." 557 F.2d at 982 (emphasis original).
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lower prices." '8 To rule otherwise would, according to the Second
Circuit, "emasculate Automatic Canteen
and the purpose of §
2(f) in that large buyers could consistently play one seller off
against another to the point where all bids are below sellers' costs
and then in reliance upon the sellers' potential good faith and its
'meeting competition' defenses, thus vindicate the final price."1 87
Furthermore, the Second Circuit considered A&P's position as
conflicting with the legislative origins of the meeting competition
defense in section 2 of the Clayton Act, which was intended to permit a seller to defend against local competition without having to
cut prices in all areas where it did business and simultaneously to
permit a seller trying to enter a new territory to cut prices only
locally 188 That Congress intended to expand the scope of the meeting competition defense vis-a-vis buyers when it was amending
section 2 in order to end power buyer abuses is difficult to believe.
A&P also unsuccessfully argued before the Second Circuit that
Kroger was not controlling because Kroger was a "lying buyer"
who had made actual misrepresentations to the seller whereas A&P
had been exonerated under section 5 of the FTC Act for its behavior during the negotiations with Borden. A&P asserted it was inconsistent for the FTC to dismiss the charges of unfair trade practices under section 5 on the rationale that imposition of liability
under that provision would require a buyer affirmatively to disclose
to a seller that its bid had beaten a competitor's bid and thus
would run counter to the public interest in rigorous competitive
price bargaining,8 9 while the FTC imposed liability for the same
conduct under section 2(f) The Second Circuit deemed the apparent inconsistency between a finding of section 2(f) liability and exoneration under section 5 "more apparent than real."'' 0 The court
approved scholarly comment that section 5 should not reach instances of price discrimination that are either explicitly included or
excluded from the coverage of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 1 In other
186. 346 U.S. at 79. See generally Curtis, Buyer Liability Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 42 ANTrRuST L.J. 345, 351-52 (1973).
187. 557 F.2d at 982-83.
188. Id. at 983. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 2-3 (1914); F ROWE,
supra note 2, § 9.1, at 208-09.
189. 87 F.T.C. at 1050.
190. 557 F.2d at 983.
191. Id. at 983-84. See Reeves, Toward a Coherent Antitrust Policy: The Role of Section 5
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words, A&P's liability under section 2(f) had to be assessed mdependently without regard to any other statute. Consequently, section 5 absolution did not ipso facto absolve A&P under section
2(f) 192
That the position of the FTC and the Second Circuit produces
an anomalous result is beyond dispute. The apparent explanation
for this result is that the Robinson-Patman Act is directed specifically at the type of conduct engaged in by A&P, whereas the FTC
Act is not. The Supreme Court emphasized the dismissal of the
section 5 count against A&P in reversing the Second Circuit. This
raises the interesting but unanswerable inquiry as to what the
Court would have done if A&P never had been charged with violating section 5 or had been found guilty by the FTC. Writing for the
Court and commenting on the point, Justice Stewart made the
rather extraordinary statement that "[n]either the Commission nor
the Court of Appeals offered any explanation for this apparent
anomaly "I3 The Second Circuit could well be wrong, but it did
attempt to explain why exoneration under the FTC Act did not
automatically absolve A&P under the Robinson-Patman Act. The
majority almost appears not to have read the Second Circuit
opinion.
The court of appeals concluded that the Kroger construction of
section 2(f) was "salutary and correct" ' 4 and to be applied even
when the buyer had not affirmatively lied to the seller. If the rationale of section 2(f) is to keep buyers from inducing lower prices
that are indefensible, the rationale applies equally when buyers remain silent about the nature of the competitive bid as when they
lie. ' The court also observed that the line between the affirmative
misrepresentation in Kroger and statements such as A&P's to Borden that it was not "in the ball park" and that a $50,000 improvement in the bid would not be a "drop in the bucket" was a fine one
indeed.'96
of the FederalTrade Commission Act in PriceDiscriminationRegulation, 16 B.C. INDus. &
COM. L. Ray. 151, 198 (1975).
192. 557 F.2d at 984.
193. 440 U.S. at 81.
194. 557 F.2d at 983.
195. Id.
196. Id. Justice Stewart contended that A&P's only "misrepresentation" was made after
Borden had made its second bid, so it could not have induced the bid, 440 U.S. at 81 n.15.
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Although the Second Circuit's position may be logically sound, it
appears to go too far by placing a buyer in the almost untenable
position of having to ask for a higher price. This is basically the
position of Justice Marshall, who dissented not from the majority's
conclusion that the "innocent" recipient of a lower bid could not
utilize the seller's meeting competition defense, but from its construction of section 2(f) that permits the "lying buyer" to escape
liability and from its "fact finding" that Borden could establish its
meeting competition defense.
According to the majority of the Supreme Court, A&P could not
be guilty of violating section 2(f) if Borden had a valid meeting
competition defense; a price discrimination "prohibited by this section" as used in the provision cannot exist if the seller has a valid
' Although the Court claimed it was
meeting competition defense. 97
not deciding the "lying buyer" case,' 8 this appears inaccurate. If
the liability under section 2(f) is derivative in nature, a lying buyer
cannot be liable if the seller can establish the section 2(b) defense
"[u]nder the plain meaning of § 2(f) "I" The phrase "plain meaning" is used advisedly because notwithstanding countless judicial
and scholarly comments on the opaqueness of the Robinson-Patman Act,200 the majority thrice referred to the "plain meaning" of
section 2(f)21 in its holding and further stated the following: "The
clear language of § 2(f) states that a buyer can be liable only if he
receives a price discrimination 'prohibited by this section.' If a
seller has a valid meeting competition defense, there is simply no
As Justice Marshall tellingly noted, however, no finding was made on the issue of misrepresentation because evidence of misrepresentation was irrelevant under the standard applied
by the FTC. Id. at 91-92.
197. Id. at 78.
198. Id. at 81 n.15. Of course, as Justice Marshall pointed out, if the Court truly intended
not to decide the "lying buyer" issue, it was improper not to remand the case for an actual
determination whether the exception applied. Id. at 91.
199. Id. at 76.
200. Even Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion in Automatic Canteen, observed
that "precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman
Act
.," 346 U.S. at 65, and referred to the "infelicitous language of § 2(b)." Id. at 78.
The majority m A&P clearly ignored the admonition of Justice Frankfurter "to avoid inadvertent pronouncement on statutory language in one context when the same language may
require separate consideration in other settings," id. at 65, if it was not deciding the "lying
buyer" case.
201. 440 U.S. at 76, 78, 81.
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prohibited price discrimination. 0'2 2 How the Court condemns the
lying buyer with this language is difficult to see. Just as there is no
price discrimination if the ignorant seller improves his bid without
being told he is beating competition, there is no "prohibited price
discrimination" if a misled seller does the same.
To the majority, construing section 2(f) so that a buyer can be
liable even if the seller has a valid defense was an attempt to
amend judicially the Robinson-Patman Act. Justice Stewart compared this effort with FTC v. Simplicity PatternCo.2 3 wherein the
Court stated that "this Court is not in a position to review the economic wisdom of Congress" and that "[w]e cannot supply what
Congress has studiously omitted. ' 24 Of course, repealing a statute
is also an act of judicial legislation. By construing section 2(f) as
creating derivative liability and ignoring the congressional purpose
of section 2(f) of curtailing coercive practices by power buyers, the
majority arguably has committed such an act.
As Justice Marshall noted m his dissent, neither the language
nor the sparse legislative history of the-provision justified the majority's interpretation precluding buyer liability unless the seller
also can be found liable for price discrimination.2 5 According to
Justice Marshall, the language m section 2(f) referring to a discrimination in price "which is prohibited by this section" does not
make the liability of the buyer derivative but rather incorporates
by reference the elements of the section 2(a) offense and the cost
justification and meeting competition defenses. Consequently, section 2(f) requires the establishment of the same basic elements and
makes available the same basic affirmative defenses regardless
whether the seller or buyer is being charged. Under this interpretation of section 2(f), which does not require a seller to be guilty of a
section 2(a) offense, buyer and seller liability may be determined
202. Id. at 78.
203. 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959).
204. Id. at 67. Justice Stewart failed to acknowledge, however, that courts have read
words out of certain provisions of the Act and have read words into other provisions from
which Congress, whether studiously or not, omitted them. Comparethe interpretation of the
§ 2(c) brokerage provision in Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940) with the interpretations of the § 2(b) meeting competition defense
in Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 888 (1962) and the § 2(d) promotional allowance provision in FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,
390 U.S. 341 (1968).
205. 440 U.S. at 86.
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independently Justice Marshall considered this construction as
placing less strain on the "plain meaning" of section 2(f) than did
the absolutely derivative standard of the majority 20 The legislative
history of section 2(f) buttresses his position. Although it was an
"afterthought," it was prompted by the late realization that halting buyers' abusive practices could not be accomplished solely by
imposing liability on sellers and that a proscription applicable to
buyers was needed." 7 Buyer and seller liability logically should be
independently determinable.
Justice Marshall did not perceive Automatic Canteen as a barrier because the Court in that case was not purporting to define the
precise contours of the elements and defenses of section 2(f) liability; rather, it was concerned with the allocation of "the burden of
coming forward with evidence under § 2(f) of the Act."2 ' Regarding
judicial legislation, he noted 2 9 that Justice Frankfurter had observed that section 2(f) was "roughly the counterpart, as to buyers,
of sections of the Act dealing with discrimination by sellers. '210 In
effect, he was observing that the majority had deleted "roughly" in
making section 2(f) the exact counterpart of section 2(a)
Under Justice Marshall's view, A&P would not be guilty of violating section 2(f) if it simply invited Borden to meet a lower bid
and fortuitously received a still lower bid. A buyer acting in good
faith in such a situation could sustain the section 2(b) defense. The
"good faith" of the buyer would be the key, so that the lying buyer
would be liable whereas the silent buyer would not.
The argument of the FTC and the Second Circuit that section
2(f) applies to the innocent as well as the lying buyer is tenable.
Admittedly, however, such a construction of the Robinson-Patman
Act could impose undue restrictions on the competitive process.
Nevertheless, to construe section 2(f) in the guise of its "plain
meaning" and supposed "clear language" to permit the lying buyer
to escape liability under the Act is unfortunate. It is to be hoped
that if the lying buyer case ever reaches the Supreme Court, it will
adopt Justice Marshall's position. This would retain section 2(f),
206. Id.
207. Id. at 87. See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-7, 17 (1936).
208. 346 U.S. at 65.
209. 440 U.S. at 89.
210. 346 U.S. at 63.
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the provision that was to supplant interseller verification condemned in Gypsum, as a viable part of the Act. Although the result would be inconsistent with A&P, consistency is not the most
21
distinguished feature of the Robinson-Patman Act. '
Perhaps the FTC should have dropped the A&P proceeding.
A&P clearly had not engaged in the same type of conduct as had
Kroger, and certainly was a more sympathetic respondent. The Supreme Court conceivably could have taken a more "liberal" approach to section 2(f) and not adopted the "derivative" standard
21 2
had it been presented with a different case.
Two lower courts anticipated the result reached in A&P In Harbor Banana Distributors,Inc. v. FTC,231 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit set aside an FTC cease and desist order that a
banana importer and a distributor had violated sections 2(a) and
2(f) of the Act. The court viewed the actions of the importer as
those of a reasonable and prudent person, thus satisfying the sec211. Because it reversed, the Supreme Court did not reach A&P's challenge to the scope
and breadth of the FTC's order. The order provided that in the future A&P would have the
burden of going forward with the meeting competition defense and required A&P to distribute the order nationwide to its operating divisions and to its dairy products suppliers.
The Second Circuit limited its review of the order because the primary responsibility in
developing relief is the Commission's, FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965);
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957). Additionally, the Commission has been
granted wide discretion in choosing the remedies necessary to cope with unlawful practices.
FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959); Jacob Siegal Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
The FTC's authority to formulate remedial orders under the Robinson-Patman Act is quite
extensive and is not limited to entering orders directed only to specific violations found to
exist. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d
674, 681-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965). The reason for the rule is simple. A
restricted or limited order could be circumvented easily. See generally F RoWE, supra note
2, at 504-14; Kinter, Scope of Federal Trade Commission Orders in Price Discrimination
Cases, 14 Bus. LAw. 1053 (1959).
The order was upheld notwithstanding that A&P's private label arrangement with Borden
had ended five years before the Second Circuit's decision. The mere fact that practices have
been terminated and that there are written assurances against their resumption does not bar
cease and desist orders. See, e.g., Diener's Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 1132, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(per curiam); Cotherman v. FTC, 417 F.2d 587, 595 (5th Cir. 1969); Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 415, 418 (6th Cir. 1965). The nationwide scope of the order was0
upheld because the private label program involved A&P's national director of purchases and
was initiated by its national headquarters in New York even though only the Chicago unit
was involved. 557 F.2d at 987-88.
212. The Court would have remanded the case had it not wanted to let A&P off the hook.
Alternatively, the Court could have decided that the FTC had abused its discretion and
overstepped its bounds. See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 366 (1962).
213. 499 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1974).
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tion 2(b) defense. It also set aside the order against the distributor
because the section 2(b) defense precluded a finding of a section
2(a) violation. The court in HarborBanana apparently took the derivative nature approach of the majority in A&P It must be emphasized, however, that the case involved neither the lying buyer of
Kroger nor the possibly "overly hard" bargainer of A&P Although
the result is consistent with A&P, it is not inconsistent with Justice

Marshall's dissenting opinion.
In Big Value Stamp Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 24 a treble
damage action, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
held that a party barred from maintaining a section 2(a) action
against the seller also was barred from maintaining a section 2(f)
action against the buyer."1 ' According to the court in Big Value, the
two sections are closely related, and the purpose of section 2(f) is
merely to place the legal responsibility for the prohibited price discrimination on the buyer as well as the seller. That a party would
have standing to sue either the seller or the buyer but not the other
was mconceivable. 26 Like Harbor Banana, however, Big Value is
not inconsistent with the Marshall view
CONCLUSION

The decision in A&P might be justified despite its effect on section 2(f) if it fosters sporadic price cutting that results in downward
price pressures in oligopolistic price systems .217 If it does not have
this ameliorative impact, then it is unfortunate. The derivative
214. 1967 Trade Cas. 71,978 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
215. In fact, private plaintiffs bringing § 2(0 actions generally have been unsuccessful or
at best partially successful. See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d
793 (9th Cir. 1969); Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969); Hartley &
Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962); State Wholesale Grocers
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958), rev'g 154 F Supp. 471 (N.D. Ill.
1957); Kapiolam Motors, Ltd. v. General Motors Corp., 337 F Supp. 102 (D. Hawaii 1972);
Metropolitan Dry Cleaning Mach. Co. v. Washex Mach. Corp., 1969 Trade Cas.
72,686
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Rosenfeld Co. v. Lion Mfg. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas.
69,937 (N.D. i1.
1961); Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 178 F Supp. 230 (D. Mass.), aff'd on other
grounds, 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959); Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 174 F Supp.
414 (D.N.J. 1959); Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).
The "partially successful" reference is to cases such as Krug, in which the adequacy of the §
2(f) complaint was tested by a motion to dismiss rather than by consideration of plaintiff's
evidence in support of the allegations.
216. 1967 Trade Cas. at 83,461.
217. See generally The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 9, at 242.
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standard of A&P has restricted severely the application of section
2(f) and has opened the door to the power buyer abuses that concerned Congress when it passed the Act and concerned the FTC in
the early 1970's.18 Borden's second bid doubtless was the result of
the quantity of Borden products purchased by A&P A small grocery store or even a small grocery chain seeking to establish a private label program probably could not have its estimated annual
savings doubled merely by stating that an initial bid was "not in
the ball park." In any event, notwithstanding potential benefits
from A&P on oligopolistic prices, the "solo tango" clearly is a thing
of the past. Or it will be if the Supreme Court acts consistently
Thus it still, or perhaps once again, takes two to tango.

218. See generally Galanti, supra note 1, at 966-67.

